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Starting from the end of the fourth century, the Buddhist monastic community in China 
entered a protracted confrontation with a variety of political regimes, Sinitic and barbarian, 
significantly affecting their own processes of state formation and the reconstitution of a uni-
fied empire after a long period of division. Although elites and rulers often lavished patron-
age upon the clergy, and used Buddhism to buttress their authority, the overall response of 
these regimes, especially in the north, was unforgiving. Four persecutions from 446 to 955 
and increasingly tight regulation effectively undermined monastic prerogatives, ultimately 
thwarting the emergence of a Buddhist ›church‹ in China. The last major episode of suppres-
sion intriguingly took place only a few years before the founding of the Song dynasty (960-
1279) and China’s subsequent transition towards what many historians have seen as her first 
modern period. Buddhism did live on in the new era, but as a social body it was terminally 
hamstrung by the state’s inflexible grip.
Comparing this trajectory to the fortunes of Christianity in the late antique Mediterranean 
and then in early medieval Europe raises several counterfactual questions. One of the most 
important perhaps concerns the long-term effect that religious exemption, or the lack there-
of, respectively had on imperial state formation on the two sides, in what Walter Scheidel 
has called the ›First Great Divergence‹ between China and Western Eurasia. Whether the rise 
of the Christian church with its privileges may have decisively stood in the way of an impe-
rial resurgence in the West is an already old question; but whether, conversely, the Chinese 
state’s successful confrontation with Buddhism was key to its extraordinary endurance as 
an imperial entity is a still largely unexplored avenue of inquiry, which this paper intends to 
probe.
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Did the Buddhist clergy enjoy forms of religious immunity in premodern China? In address-
ing this broad question, allow me to start with a mildly facetious warning: let’s not take any 
exemption for granted; or put another way, let us bracket our assumptions about who would 
grant exactly what, and to whom. We need, in fact, to pierce through a thick layer of hind-
sight wrapping all those things we want to know about in the past – state, church, religion, 
to name but few.
My remarks will be mostly confined to medieval China, though not even this plain com-
pound should be seen as entirely uncontentious. Several Sinologists, Michael Nylan for ex-
ample, have cautioned that any backward projection of ›China‹ may mislead us »to imagine 
the early dynasties on the model of the modern nation-state«, rather than the contested pur-
view of courts and elites presiding over fluid processes of ethnic and political formation.1 As 
for the ›medieval‹, its catches have been exposed long enough for us to sense the awkward in 
its application to Chinese history between two major imperial breakdowns, the Han 漢 in the 
third century and the Tang 唐 in the tenth.2 These caveats, to be sure, are only there to whisper 
critical nuance, not certainly to trumpet from the outset a terminological fundamentalism 
that would soon leave us speechless, should we rashly stick to it. But at least they should sug-
gest reasons why the words ›Late Antiquity‹ are in my title. This paradigm, by no means un-
disputed in itself, may well lend narrative coherence to a significant swathe of glob al history: 
I have started suggesting elsewhere, and will do at greater length in forthcoming work, that 
the centuries in which the Roman empire dissolves and Christianity rises have in teresting 
things to say when looked at from the perspective of the entire Old World oikou mene. The 
emergence, across boundaries, of communities defined by a new mode of dis course that we 
now identify as ›religion‹ is, in fact, a crucial marker of this period well beyond the Medi-
terranean, and most certainly in Buddhist Asia.3 Conceiving this shift as a tale of churches 
and states, of religious groups vying with secular rulers, would probably miss much of the 
process that brought these entities to define and establish themselves against each other 
through the negotiated devolution of a common metapolitical order.4 My global Late Anti-
quity starts therefore with the crisis and demise of the two great imperial formations at the 
opposite ends of the Old World, the Roman and the first Chinese empire, followed on both
1 See her introduction to Nylan and Loewe, China’s Early Empires, 2-3; cf. Teiser, Reinventing the Wheel, 42-43, 49. 
Such remarks are now frequent among scholars of modern and late imperial China, although still rare in historical 
discourse on earlier periods. For a forceful critique of the notion of ›China‹ in premodern history, see Dirlik, Born 
in Translation.
2 On the trouble with the ›Medieval‹ see, among many others, Robinson, Medieval, the Middle Ages; Reuter, Me-
dieval. On China in particular, see Barrett, China and the Redundancy of the Medieval, and Tanigawa, Rethinking 
»Medieval China«, 1-12.
3 See Palumbo, From Constantine the Great to Emperor Wu, and Palumbo, Buddhist Eschatology and Kingship. Im-
portant critical reassessments of the concept ›Late Antiquity‹ are in Giardina, Esplosione di tardoantico; Marcone, 
Tarda antichità; Marcone, Long Late Antiquity; James, Rise and Function. I make no claim to break entirely new 
ground: S. A. M. Adshead, for example, has seen a »China in Late Antiquity« between 400 and 1000 (although 
that chiefly meant mapping China’s history against the latter period in the West), and Jerry Bentley proposed a 
global »post-classical age« from about 500 to 1000 AD. See Adshead, China in World History, 54-108, and Bentley, 
Cross-Cultural Interaction, 763-766 (partly contradicted in Bentley, Hemispheric Integration). Neither periodiza-
tion, however, takes Late Antiquity seriously (and both leave out the fourth century, arguably the defining segment 
of this age).
4 See Palumbo, From Constantine the Great to Emperor Wu, 118-122, and pp. 131-143 in this paper.
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sides by political and social fragmentation and the simultaneous ascendancy, from the fourth 
century, of large social bodies centred on ›religion‹, what we call Christianity and Buddhism 
respectively. These remarkably similar trajectories, however, appear to have parted at the 
end of the sixth century. While the Chinese sphere then recovered a political, cultural and 
territorial unity that it was to keep until modern times, the Roman Empire never came back, 
as neither Byzantium nor the Islamic caliphates were able to reinstate comparable polities 
in western Eurasia. So, at least, some of those few who have peered out of regional histories 
have remarked.5 One of them, Walter Scheidel, has called this phenomenon the ›First Great 
Divergence‹, as opposed to the Great Divergence that Kenneth Pomeranz has set in modern 
times.6 According to Scheidel, this early parting of the ways between China and the West 
projected long shadows on their respective futures:
…the cyclical restoration of a China-wide empire in the East and the decline of empire 
and central government in the West, followed by the slow creation of a polycentric 
state system that proved resistant to any attempts to impose hegemony.
Entering modernity as a dynamic political pluriverse would have given Europe a fateful 
edge over its once-thriving East Asian counterpart. The rest is well known.7
Let me hasten to point out that I find this narrative none too convincing. One reason 
is that the imperial comeback at the end of the sixth century may have been far less of the 
water shed these scholars imagine, as the dynastic polities that made it were considerably 
more precarious than they admit. The Tang in particular, after a glorious ride of a hundred 
years, from the mid-eighth century could only cast a ritual authority over a largely fragment-
ed territory that in 907 would shed even this fiction of unity. One should wait at least until 
the advent and consolidation of the Song 宋 from the end of the tenth century for the im perial 
cycle in China to acquire its unique endurance, but that would have been an altogether differ-
ent world.8 Yet, a divergence there was, and after so much history in parallel one should be 
no less than intrigued at how it came about. What I would like to start assessing here is how 
the tugs of war, at times very warlike indeed, between newly emerging monastic bodies and 
political elites shaped the respective destinies of the Buddhist community and the im perial 
entity in China, before and until the latter seemingly found its alchemy for self- perpetuation, 
at the end of the first millennium of the Common Era.
5 See, for example, Adshead, China in World History, 55, and Lewis, China between Empires, 54.
6 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, influentially arguing that China and Europe shared a not too dissimilar path of de-
velopment up to the Industrial Revolution. For a valuable long-term view of this question see now Davids, Religion, 
which focuses on the different role of religious institutions in the formation of human capital and the circulation 
of useful knowledge in China and Europe between 700 and 1800.
7 See Scheidel, State Formation (quotation on p. 11); also Fiscal Regimes, 194. Adshead, whose influence on Scheidel 
is apparent, had sketched similar insights (China in World History, 55).
8 For an excellent overview contrasting the radical changes in China between the eighth and the eleventh centuries, 
see Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, 7-42. Note that even the Song is too early for some historians: according to 
Arif Dirlik, »[i]t was the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, following Yuan (Mongol) consolida-
tion, that created the coherent and centralized bureaucratic despotism that we have come to know as ›China‹.« 
Until then, there had been »ongoing political fluctuation between dynastic unity and a ›multistate polycentric 
system‹« (Born in Translation).
medieval worlds • No. 6 • 2017 • 118-155
Exemption not Granted
121
The early centuries of Buddhism in China: exemptions without a religious order?
Even those who are less familiar with Buddhism will have been baffled by my hint above at 
its rise from as late as the fourth century AD. Didn’t the Buddha live long before that, indeed 
long before Jesus? And was there not a Buddhist monastic community, the saṃgha, in place 
from the early days? In India, of course, Buddhist monks and devotion had been around 
since at least the time of the Maurya emperor Aśoka (third century BC). However, the nor-
mative image of a highly structured monastic community that emerges from the vinayas, the 
disciplinary codes of a number of Buddhist schools, earns very little corroboration from the 
extant epigraphic and archaeological record before the early centuries of the Common Era, 
as the research of Gregory Schopen has argued, profusely and trenchantly, for the past three 
decades.9 Even by the time when such normative standards were no doubt extant, from the 
third to the early fourth centuries AD, a Buddhist order was still much of a chimera, at least 
in places like the Central Asian kingdom of Kroraina, where an Indian community of part-
time monks with wives, children, slaves, and properties had to rely on the local king for its 
own regulation.10
Be that as it may, we know that, in China, Buddhist worship and doctrines entered court 
circles around the turn of the Common Era. From the late second century, we learn of in-
dividual monks and monasteries, especially in connection to the translation activities of a 
few foreign masters.11 But before the end of the fourth century, which means a consider-
able amount of time since our earliest evidence, there is very little suggestion of organized 
Buddhist clergies. Communal activities seem to have clustered around rather large sacred 
areas centred on a sanctum enshrining some kind of vestiges of the Buddha, statues or relics. 
These establishments, named in the sources as ›Buddha shrines‹ (Futu ci 浮屠祠) or simply 
›buddhas‹ (Futu 浮屠), could seemingly host up to thousands of people on occasion, but what 
relationship they had with regular monks, or even whether regular monks as defined in the 
vinayas existed at all at this stage, is not altogether clear.12
This scenario is immediately relevant to the question of religious exemption, certain 
forms of which begin to be mentioned from the fourth century in consistently accusatory re-
ports. Thus in ca. AD 335, the Xiongnu ruler Shi Hu 石虎, then holding sway in the northern 
part of a divided China and himself a Buddhist devotee, invited his Chinese officials to de-
liberate on whether such worship was appropriate for the common people in the hamlets 
and villages, and noted his concern that among the śramaṇas (Buddhist monks), now very 
numerous, there were some who were criminals or labour service dodgers (biyi 避役), and
9 See the numerous essays collected in Schopen, Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks; and Buddhist Monks and Busi-
ness Matters, notably the discussion at 73-80. A useful summary of the state of our knowledge of the vinayas and 
their dates is in Clarke, Family Matters, 18-21.
10 On the monks of Kroraina see Hansen, Religious Life in a Silk Road Community, and van Schaik, Married Monks. 
The persistence of family ties in Indian Buddhist monasticism is extensively discussed in Clarke, Family Matters.
11 For standard accounts of this early stage, see Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 21-53, and Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest of 
China, 22-57.
12 I have given a preliminary inventory of the evidence for these establishments in Palumbo, Apropos of the Stūpa 
of Kang Senghui. On the terminological obscurity concerning Buddhist ›shrines‹ and ›monasteries‹ in the early 
period, see Barrett, From Shrine to Monastery.
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many who were just not monks.13 Several decades later, in 404, a Southern lord has similar 
remarks: »evaders of labour service (biyi 避役) gather in a hundred hamlets, fugitives make 
crowds in monasteries and temples.«14 Again in the south, in 458, a ruler complains that the 
community of monks had turned into a »harbour for fugitives« (busou 逋藪).15 Some scholars 
have seen in these scattered records early indications of fiscal exemption for the monastic 
community.16 However, things are less straightforward and arguably more interesting. What 
we have here are in fact repeated references to fugitives, criminals, and people shirking cor-
vée duties found in large numbers in Buddhist temples and among the monks. Nothing is 
said about any avoidance of or exemption from taxes in general. Labour service (yi 役) was a 
fiscal obligation of sorts for adult male peasants, who could be called on limited shifts of up 
to one month per year, normally in their locality; its brunt, however, was chiefly borne by 
convicts and enslaved prisoners, who would serve considerably longer terms in the harshest 
conditions and anywhere the state authority commanded them.17 The regular association 
in our early sources between fugitives and corvée absconders suggests that it was notably 
this group they had in view rather than the ordinary peasantry. Significantly, it does look as 
though Buddhist temples and monastic communities enjoyed some kind of extraterritoriali-
ty, since those evading arrest or labour conscription could find sanctuary in them. It remains 
to be seen whether such immunity attended to monastic status, or rather to the power of 
place. By the time of our records (fourth-fifth centuries) an organized saṃgha was no doubt 
emerging, but while nothing proves that Buddhist monks enjoyed special privileges, much 
would seem to suggest the opposite, as we shall see.
Some of our earliest evidence of a Buddha-shrine concerns Zhai Rong 窄融, a warlord 
in the Jiangsu 江蘇 region at the end of the Han, who around AD 194 used his authority 
to erect a very large sacred compound of this sort, reportedly making room for more than 
5,000 people (a figure that could double on festive occasions). In order to attract devotees 
to his Buddhist foundation and allow them to »receive the doctrine« (shou dao 受道), Zhai 
13 Gaoseng zhuan (T vol. 50 no. 2059), 385b28-c4; cf. Wright, Fo-t’u-têng, 354-356. All translations are mine unless 
otherwise noted. Shi Hu (r. 334-349) was a sovereign of the north in the short-lived Later Zhao 趙 dynasty; his 
request sparked the earliest official remonstrances against Buddhism on record in China.
14 Hongming ji (T vol. 52 no. 2102), 85a18-19, reporting the words of Huan Xuan 桓玄 (d. 404), who had freshly usur-
ped the Jin 晉 throne in Jiankang and was then trying to crack down on the Buddhist clergy. Cf. Zürcher, Buddhist 
Conquest of China, 260, who (mis)understands butao 逋逃 in the second part of the sentence as referring to tax-eva-
ders, as does Ch’en, Chinese Transformation of Buddhism, 92; not so Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 42.
15 See Song shu, 97.2386-87; also in Guang hongming ji (T vol. 52 no. 2103), 278b8-12. These were the words of em-
peror Xiaowudi 孝武帝 of the Liu Song 劉宋 (r. 454-465), ordering a purge of the clergy after a rebellion that had 
implicated a Buddhist monk. Here too, Zürcher (Buddhist Conquest of China, 261) sees a reference to ›tax-evaders‹ 
that is just not in the text.
16 See above, note 14.
17 See Lewis, Early Imperial China, 286, 288-289; Pearce, Status, Labor, and Law, 92-95 and passim. The imposi-
tion of labour service on the general population could be far more severe, as in southern China at the end of the 
fifth century (see He, Buddhism in the Economic History of China, 8 n. 6), but the evidence remains occasional 
and counter intuitive (enslaving the peasantry on public works would rapidly have killed an agrarian economy). 
Under the Northern dynasties, in the fifth and sixth centuries, corvée exploitation of convicts progressively made 
room for the establishment of separate hereditary groups of bondsmen and servile households recruited from war 
captives and craftsmen with their families. The system, however, petered out during the Tang: see Pearce, Status, 
Labor, and Law.
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Rong would exempt the local population from other corvée duties (fu qi ta yi 復其他役).18 
In this case at least, we can be sure that those granted exemption from labour service were 
not monks, but laypeople from surrounding areas, and in droves.19 Although such a privilege 
appears to have ensued from the ad hoc initiative of a local leader, it stands to reason that a 
Buddha-shrine with its vast compound would be seen as justifying that privilege on sacred 
grounds. Indeed, one further document from the same third-century source points rather 
neatly in this direction. In a report on the kingdom of Han 韓 in the Korean peninsula, we 
read of shamanic precincts called sodo (Ch. sutu 蘇塗), large enough to be deemed as »sepa-
rate districts« (bie yi 別邑), where heavenly spirits were worshipped around a sacred pole at 
the centre. The Chinese historian notes, »if fugitives get inside them, they (i.e. the masters 
of the sodo) never hand them over, as they are fond of those who practise banditry«; next he 
adds that »the principle on which the sodos are established is similar to the buddhas, but their 
religious practice is different.«20 In other words, the sodos of Korea were sacred areas where 
criminals and fugitives could take sanctuary, and to the author of our source they immedi-
ately called to mind the Buddha-shrines in China. It does seem, then, that from a very early 
date Buddhist compounds enjoyed some form of asylum privilege, which evidently extended 
to their visitors and residents, but was not inherent to any religious personhood of the latter. 
At the end of the third century, when these notes were written, there were just over 3,700 
monks and nuns and 180 Buddhist temples in all of China according to one count.21 The 
former figure was probably only a rough estimate, since no monastic registration is attested 
at this time, and if it referred, as it seems reasonable, to the garbed and shaven-headed ones 
that one would outwardly recognize as religious professionals (whatever their actual status), 
more substantial numbers must have been around the Buddha-shrines. Still, the size of the 
Buddhist clergy in this long period must have been overall inconsiderable, its very existence 
as a religious order ill-defined, its exemptions accordingly unobtrusive – until all this started 
to change.
18 See Sanguo zhi, 49.1185; translations in Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 295, and Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest 
of China, 28. A shorter account, omitting the reference to corvée exemption, is in Hou Han shu, 73.2368.
19 Gernet (Buddhism in Chinese Society, 30) understands the expression »receive the doctrine« (shou dao 受道) in the 
story as a reference to some sort of Buddhist monastic ordination, noting that »the act of entering into religious 
life freed an individual from his duties as a layman«, and perches on this straw of evidence to argue that tax ex-
emption was the rule for monks. This does seem a long shot. Apart from the unlikelihood that monastic ordination 
could be performed on such a grandiose scale at this early stage, the context suggests something different. Else-
where, the author of the Sanguo zhi uses the same expression (shou dao 受道) in connection to those who »received 
the doctrine« from the Taoist master Zhang Ling 張陵 (fl. 125-144), paying a fee of five pecks of rice in exchange 
(Sanguo zhi, 8.263). Here it is clear that religious instruction for ordinary people is meant rather than ordination 
or initiation into priesthood.
20 Sanguo zhi (completed in ca. 284), 30.852 (諸亡逃至其中, 皆不還之, 好作賊。其立蘇塗之義, 有似浮屠, 而所行善惡
有異。). On the Korean sodo, see Grayson, Korea, 20.
21 Bianzheng lun (T vol. 52 no. 2110), 502c18-19. Unlike Gernet (Buddhism in Chinese Society, 6), I understand the 
mention of the »two capitals« (er jing 二京) in this passage as referring to what precedes rather than what follows, 
which means that the numbers of monks and temples are national totals (as demanded by the context) rather than 
for the two main cities only. The Bianzheng lun is a seventh-century work of Buddhist apologetics, and some of its 
information should be taken with a pinch of salt; however, there is nothing inherently implausible in its historical 
statistics on the size of the Buddhist community from the Western Jin (266-316) to the Sui (581-618). It should be 
noticed that from 280 and until their demise, the Western Jin had been able to unify Chinese territory, if only for 
three decades and before a more decisive breakup; hence the Bianzheng lun totals are likely to refer to both north 
and south.
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The first confrontation between Buddhism and the state
Everything does change in the fourth century. Especially from its latter half, the saṃgha in 
China starts looking as more and more of a separate social body, with its own leaders such 
as Dao’an 道安 (312-385), commanding authority along a network that stretches across the 
boundaries of a territory still divided between ›barbarian‹ kingdoms in the north and Sini-
tic dynasties in the south. It is Dao’an who introduces a common surname for all Buddhist 
monks – Shi 釋, a Chinese transcription of Śākya, the clan name of the Buddha – to signal 
their corporate identity. A wave of foreign missionaries from northwest India and Central 
Asia leaves its mark from north to south. The vinaya codes, first in fragments, then in full in 
the first decades of the fifth century, are finally translated into Chinese, and so are the first 
monuments of Buddhist scholasticism as well as the four āgamas, the complete scriptural 
collections of the mainstream tradition.22 At the turn of the century, a disciple of Dao’an, 
Huiyuan 慧遠 (344-416), stands up to a southern ruler to make a passionate plea for the 
monks’ exemption from the obligation to revere the emperor, in a daring blow to custom and 
convenience.23 A head-count now gives 24,000 monastics in the south alone, but certainly 
far bigger numbers were swarming across the barbarian north, and everywhere, rulers and 
ruled were falling for them.24 For all its extraordinary success, though, this viral blob of os-
tensibly meek skinheads, who according to a contemporary polemicist were even collect ing 
taxes from the populace to fund luxurious temples and monasteries for themselves,25 was 
soon to make waves of resentment.26 In 446, the Wei 魏 emperor Taiwudi 太武帝 (r. 423-
452), who at the head of his Inner Asian Xianbei 鮮卑 tribes had established himself as the 
overlord of the north, ordered an all-out persecution of Buddhism.27 Mass killings of monks 
were certainly commanded, although we do not know on what scale they were carried out, 
especially in the provinces; monasteries were destroyed, statues were melted down, their 
precious metal probably impounded for the imperial workshops. To those who escaped, this 
was the end of the Dharma at the turn of its millennium, as the prophecy would have it.28 
22 On these developments, see Palumbo, Models of Buddhist Kingship, 314-317; Palumbo, Early Chinese Commen-
tary, 1-3, 9-36 and passim; Palumbo, From Constantine the Great to Emperor Wu, 103-106.
23 On this important episode, see Hurvitz, ›Render unto Caesar‹, and Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest of China, 231-238.
24 Bianzheng lun (T vol. 52 no. 2110), 503a3-4.
25 The anonymous critic is quoted in a Buddhist apologetic tract, aptly titled ›On the rectification of calumnies‹ 
(Zhengwu lun 正誣論); see T vol. 52 no. 2102, 8a18-19, and cf. Link, Cheng-wu lun, 151-154. Remarkably, the 
equally anonymous Buddhist apologist does not at all reject the charge, but rather argues for the appropriateness 
of lavish expenditures on the symbols of the Buddhist religion. I tend to agree with Liu Yi (Shi lun Huahu jing chan-
sheng de shidai, 97-102), who places the Zhengwu lun in the early fifth century, although the mid-fourth-century 
date preferred by other scholars (e.g. Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest of China, 304) cannot be excluded.
26 On the rise and themes of anticlericalism in early medieval China, see Ch’en, Anti-Buddhist Propaganda; Zürcher, 
Buddhist Conquest of China, 254-285; Hureau, L’apparition de thèmes anticléricaux.
27 Tsukamoto, Hoku Gi Taibutei; in English, see Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 147-153; cf. Ch’en, Some Factors.
28 On the eschatological dimensions of the persecution of Buddhism in the fifth century, see Palumbo, Buddhist 
Eschatology and Kingship.
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But it was not really the end, quite the opposite in fact. Shortly after Taiwudi’s death, in 
453, Buddhism was restored, and from then on it took a spectacular expanding trajectory 
that, in the north, saw the development of a sizeable monastic economy.29 All this happen ed 
under the strict oversight of the imperial government, which appointed controllers of the 
clergy to rein in the unruly and scattered congregation of monks.30 In the 470s, a number of 
major developments occurred in quick succession. Monastic residence was enforced through 
severe limitations to the freedom of movement for Buddhist clerics.31 Mandatory monastic 
registration, which may have been introduced earlier, produced its first results in 477, with 
a census counting 77,258 monks and nuns and 6,478 monasteries.32 At the same time, the 
post-nomadic Northern Wei regime acknowledged and encouraged the role of Buddhist es-
tablishments in its still fitful agrarian conversion with the creation of two new categories of 
taxpayers, the ›saṃgha households‹ and the ›buddha households‹. The former included re-
settled captives from newly conquered territories as well as affluent farmer households, who 
were to contribute a hefty yearly tax in grains to the local monastic administrations (saṃgha 
Office, sengcao 僧曹), formally to be redistributed to the needy in years of poor crops. The 
latter group should be understood as ›households attached to the buddhas‹, the archaic name 
for Buddhist sacred areas we have encountered above: it was made of convicts and state 
slaves with their families, who were tasked with the maintenance of temples, but also with 
»working the fields and bringing in the grains« (yingtian shusu 營田輸粟). Both insti tutions 
are said to have successfully spread to the provinces.33 We should not fail to observe here 
that the bondsmen of the ›buddha households‹ were drawn from the very same categories – 
criminals and slaves – we have identified above as those reportedly crowding at the Buddha- 
shrines in search of sanctuary from forced labour. If so, what at first sight looks like a mas-
sive privilege granted to the monastic community may rather have been a ruse to make the 
status quo legal in the mutual interest of the clergy and the state, especially if the grains the 
temple bondsmen were made to grow and »bring in« were actually to be at least partly paid 
into the state granaries.34 The same marriage of convenience was soon to be exposed for
29 On the growth of the monastic economy from the late fifth century, see the classic study by Gernet, Buddhism in 
Chinese Society (originally published in French in 1956), but cf. the judicious reassessments in He, Buddhism in the 
Economic History of China, especially 12-30 on the situation at the end of the period of division.
30 When the proscription was overruled in 453, an eminent monk from Kashmir was appointed Controller of the 
Clergy (Daoren tong 道人統) on the same occasion; see Wei shu, 114.3036; cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 71. 
The office continued under the following rulers, with counterparts at province and commandery level. On the 
Northern Wei imperial administration of the Buddhist clergy, see Xie, Zhonggu Fojiao sengguan zhidu, 51-74.
31 This happened in 472: see Wei shu, 4A.137 and 114.3038; cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 76.
32 Wei shu, 114.3039; cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 78-79. See also below, note 107.
33 Wei shu, 114.3036; cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 72-73; Tsukamoto, Hoku Gi sōgiko – buttoko; Gernet, Buddhism 
in Chinese Society, 100-107; Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 154-158; Pearce, Status, Labor, and Law, 117-118. Note that 
Gernet (ibid. 100, 104-105) understands the »monastery households« (si hu 寺戶) mentioned at the end of the Wei 
shu passage as yet another type of institution, but this is in fact an alternative name for the ›buddha households‹. 
Compare the role and function of the prebendarii in medieval European monasteries, as briefly discussed in Wick-
ham, Framing the Early Middle Ages, 300-301.
34 Other scholars (as per the preceding note) have seemingly understood the expression shusu 輸粟 in the Wei shu 
passage on the buddha households as referring to grains harvested exclusively for the monastery. In other occur-
rences within the same source, however, the term regularly refers to in-kind payments into state granaries: see 
Wei shu, 9.246, 110.2861 (twice). 
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the saṃgha households, although the Wei government would make sure everyone knew who 
was wearing the trousers. Responding to complaints that the charity grains were being mis-
used for usurious loans to impoverished peasants, an edict in 511 brought their management 
back from monastic administrators to state officials.35 
Under these circumstances, the monastic community in the north kept on swelling, and 
by the end of the Wei dynasty, in the 530s, its statistics were staggering: 47 large state mo-
nasteries, 839 monasteries owned by aristocratic families, 30,000 temples across the realm, 
and an astonishing two million monks and nuns, although the last figure is expressly pre-
sented in one source as an estimate, taking into account large numbers of commoners who 
had joined the clergy to escape fiscal obligations.36 This brings us back to our initial question. 
The ambiguous fiscal status of the monks in the Period of Division
So, did these monks pay their taxes after all? How much of an exemption were they really 
enjoying? And what was the interest of the state in all this, the same state that was now intent 
on clenching the saṃgha in a firm bureaucratic grip, but only decades earlier had entertained 
no qualms in seeing to its effective annihilation?
Let us register in the first place that, in medieval China, no single document avers tax ex-
emption for the clergy as a standing regulation.37 Jacques Gernet’s groundbreaking, brilliant-
ly chaotic Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la société chinoise du Ve au Xe siècle 
(first published in 1956) may have fostered some lingering confusion on this issue: general 
monastic exemption from taxes was explicitly decreed only under the Mongol Yuan 元 dy-
nasty (1279-1368), which, on the other hand, extended it to all religious communities in the 
khanate (including Taoists, Muslims, and Christians).38
One should also bear in mind that the vinaya does not appear to condone tax evasion 
–which is equated to theft and thus classed as a pārājika, a major offence demanding ex-
pulsion from the order – although most monastic codes only envisage custom duties for 
itinerant monks, whilst offering no legislation on issues of poll or land tax.39 The Buddha’s 
admonitions to the clergy to pay their dues to the revenue officer would have been known in 
China since the first half of the fifth century, when several such codes were made available 
35 See Wei shu, 114.3041-42; cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 87-88, and the discussions in Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 
156, and Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 103-105. Despite Confucian finger-pointing at the greedy clergy in 
court circles, we should not forget that monastic administrators were clerics appointed by the state, and worked 
hand in glove with their patron. Lending on interest accruing from the inalienable property of the saṃgha was 
approved practice in some vinayas, as was the monastic ownership of slaves, both in China and in India: see res-
pectively Gernet, ibid. 102-103, 158-166 and Schopen, Buddhist Monks and Business Matters, 45-90, 193-218.
36 Bianzheng lun, 507b26-c1; and Wei shu, 114.3048; cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 103. It is the latter source, com-
pleted in 554, that adds qualifying comments on the huge numbers of the clergy. I return to this at the end of the 
next section.
37 Pace Denis Twitchett (Financial Administration, 26, 250 n. 27), claiming that the Tang code did have such a stipu-
lation; cf. Johnson (trans.), The T’ang Code, 128-129.
38 See Schurmann, Mongolian Tributary Practices, 323-325; Atago, Zeiryō yūmen ni tsuite; Sagaster, History of 
Buddhism among the Mongols, 382-389. It is a document of the Mongol period that Gernet (Buddhism in Chinese 
Society, 31) quotes as evidence of a general monastic immunity from taxation; cf. He, Buddhism in the Economic 
History of China, 39-40.
39 See now the thorough research on these issues in Pagel, Buddhist Monks in Tax Disputes, focusing on the vinaya of 
the Mūlasarvāstivāda school.
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in translation.40 These texts, the Indic original of which is lost, nevertheless reveal impor-
tant differences: while the vinayas of the Sarvāstivāda and of the Mahīśāsaka schools make 
no special pleading for the saṃgha, that of the Mahāsāṃghikas claims that only commercial 
items should be taxable, not those belonging to Buddhist monks and nuns or heretical renun-
ciants (read Brahmins).41 The Dharmaguptaka-vinaya goes further: the bhikṣus have no law 
to pay taxes (比丘無輸稅法), and they only sin if, with a thieving intent, they help laypeople 
to evade customs.42 All these rules in which errant monks serve as accessories to tax-evading 
merchants were probably devised in an Indian society where taxation of trade factored pro-
minently into fiscal revenues; against the agrarian backdrop of their Chinese translations, 
they would hardly have come across with the force of a ›render unto Caesar‹, though neither 
would they give much ammunition to a case for exemption. The normative position of the 
clergy, again as expressed in its disciplinary codes, seems to have been a guarded expectation 
to be left alone by the state on account of its ascetic withdrawal from worldly business, albeit 
with a number of very telling provisos. Surviving vinayas from a number of different schools 
include a section detailing the conditions restraining admission into the monastic order.43 
Here, among other things, one learns that slaves,44 debtors,45 those pursued by justice,46 and 
those in the king’s service, notably soldiers,47 could not receive ordination. It is certainly
40 See Shisong lü (translation of the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya, AD 406, T vol. 23 no. 1435), 379c5-23; Sifen lü (Dharma-
guptaka-vinaya, AD 412, T vol. 22 no. 1428), 573c12-13, 681b18-682a8; Mohesengqi lü (Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya, AD 
418, T vol. 22 no. 1425), 252b12-253b1; Mishasai bu hexi wufen lü (Mahīśāsaka-vinaya, AD 425, T vol. 22 no. 1421), 
7a11-12. On the translation of these codes into Chinese, see Heirman, Vinaya.
41 Mohesengqi lü (T vol. 22 no. 1425), 253a26-29.
42 Sifen lü (T vol. 22 no. 1428), 574c7-11.
43 See Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, 166-171 for a useful overview of the parallel structure of the extant codes.
44 See Shisong lü (Sarvāstivāda, T vol. 23 no. 1435), 151c13-29; Sifen lü (Dharmaguptaka, T vol. 22 no. 1428), 
807b19-c6; Mohesengqi lü (Mahāsāṃghika, T vol. 22 no. 1425), 421b17-c12; Mishasai bu hexi wufen lü (Mahīśāsaka, 
T vol. 22 no. 1421), 115b10. For a translation of the version in Pali from the canon of the Theravāda school, see 
Horner, Book of the Discipline (IV), 95-96.
45 See Shisong lü (Sarvāstivāda, T vol. 23 no. 1435), 152a1-17; Sifen lü (Dharmaguptaka, T vol. 22 no. 1428), 807c15-
28; Mohesengqi lü (Mahāsāṃghika, T vol. 22 no. 1425), 420a18-b6; Mishasai bu hexi wufen lü (Mahīśāsaka, T vol. 22 
no. 1421), 115a26-b10. For the Theravāda version, see Horner, Book of the Discipline (IV), 95.
46 See Sifen lü (Dharmaguptaka, T vol. 22 no. 1428), 807c6-15. Theravāda: see Horner, Book of the Discipline (IV), 93-
94.
47 See Shisong lü (Sarvāstivāda, T vol. 23 no. 1435), 156a8, 156b1 (no narrative); Sifen lü (Dharmaguptaka, T vol. 22 
no. 1428), 811c1-13; Mohesengqi lü (Mahāsāṃghika, T vol. 22 no. 1425), 419c26-420a18; Mishasai bu hexi wufen 
lü (Mahīśāsaka, T vol. 22 no. 1421), 116b1-18. Theravāda: see Horner, Book of the Discipline (IV), 91-92. Note that 
while the article and its etiological narrative refer to a soldier, the Pali and Sanskrit term for the latter, rājabhaṭa, 
literally means ›a king’s servant‹, and is accordingly understood in the Chinese translations as ›an official‹ (guanren 
官人). The exception is the vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghikas, where a literal rendition of rājabhaṭa as wangchen 王
臣, ›a king’s servant‹, could be construed as referring specifically to officials but also to any subject serving the 
ruler. The extensive implications of this wording are here balanced by an interesting casuistry (ibid.), in which the 
Buddha distinguishes four types of such subjects: those with rank and salary, those with rank but no salary, those 
with salary but no rank, those with neither rank nor salary. He explains that the first two categories are not allowed 
to become monks either »in this kingdom« or in other kingdoms. Those with salary but no rank are not allowed 
into the order ›in this kingdom‹, but they may in other kingdoms. Those with neither rank nor salary are admitted 
as monks in every kingdom. This formulation would arguably make room for the acceptance into the clergy of 
virtually everyone in the king’s service (thus including conscripts and corvée labourers), with the sole exception of 
rank- and salary-holders.
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significant that in some though not all of the vinayas, the relevant rules, which the Buddha 
establishes so as not to irk those in power and thus safeguard the integrity of the saṃgha, 
are often presented as exceptions to a generic immunity granted by the king to all monks 
and nuns: »There is nothing to do against those who go forth among the recluses, sons of 
the Sakyans.‹48 However, it is not difficult to see that anyone owing taxes and corvées to the 
state would easily fall within one or the other of the categories above, so that the monastic 
community would have had to tread on eggshells only to abide by its own standards. This is 
most paradoxically reflected in what must be an interpolation – and all the more interesting 
for us because it is an interpolation – in the discipline of the Dharmaguptakas. This vinaya 
is unique in that it expressly includes among those barred from ordination »someone having 
[their] name [in the state] registers, or someone evading state taxation« (或有名籍, 或避官租
賦).49 The context in which this passage occurs suggests that it was inserted directly into the 
Chinese text, although it is difficult to determine whether this happened at the time of its 
initial translation in 412 or later, possibly under the Tang, when the Dharmaguptaka- vinaya 
rose to normative prominence in China.50 Whoever tampered with it and made up this rule 
must have faced the situation it claims to counter; but if our interpolation does seem to 
confirm from the inside a recurrent outsider accusation that people would join the Buddhist 
clergy only to shelter themselves from taxation, it does not thereby also prove the existence 
of a legal exemption in the background. In fact, it rather contradicts it: for if monks were 
not to pay taxes, why would anyone not paying taxes be denied ordination as a monk?51 This 
apparent non sequitur can be accounted for in different ways. The authors of the rule, for 
example, may have lived in a society where taxation only hit certain sectors of the popula-
tion, or at least so they wished. Elites extracting revenue chiefly from trade or from routine 
plunder may well have allowed that, after all, and it may be no coincidence that the one 
48 Horner, Book of the Discipline (IV), 93-94 (cases of fugitives from justice), 95 (debtor and slave), translating a for-
mula appearing no less than four times in the vinaya in Pali of the Theravāda school, and alleging to report a decree 
of the Magadhan king Bimbisāra, a contemporary and well-wisher of the Buddha. Among the four codes translated 
into Chinese in the fifth century, only those of the Dharmaguptakas and Mahīśāsakas report this ruling in favour 
of the monks, although in somewhat different words: see respectively Sifen lü (T vol. 22 no. 1428), 807b28-c2, 
807c22-24, and Mishasai bu hexi wufen lü (T vol. 22 no. 1421), 115b1-2. The vinaya stories quoting the decree show 
both that it could be invoked for immunity (e.g. for debtors or fugitives seeking refuge among monks) and that it 
did not work (since ordination for such immunity-seekers was disallowed).
49 Sifen lü (T vol. 22 no. 1428), 814a21-22. The line is already in a manuscript fragment of the Dharmaguptaka-vinaya 
from Dunhuang, probably dating to the eighth century (ms. 北 6806 [芥 011], now BD06011), although here the 
word ›taxes‹ (zufu 租賦) is replaced (deliberately?) by a meaningless homophone (祖傅); see Huang, Dunhuang 
baozang, vol. 102, 38.
50 The clauses have no parallels in the other vinayas. Moreover, they occur in a section itemizing disabilities and 
physical deformities on account of which one cannot become a monk: see Sifen lü (T vol. 22 no. 1428), 814a18-b20; 
cf. Horner, Book of the Discipline (IV), 115-116. In this graphic gallery – including the dumb, the deaf, the blind, 
the hairless, the toothless, all sorts of amputees, men with scabs, with swelling tumours, with one or no testicles, 
with strange-coloured eyes, with beastly bodies or faces, and much more – healthy tax-evaders do stand out as in-
truders. The reference to name registers (mingji 名籍) and in-kind tax (zufu 租賦, cf. Twitchett, Financial Adminis-
tration, 2, 208 n. 10) also has a distinct Chinese ring to it. For the general adoption of the Dharmaguptaka-vinaya 
under the Tang, see Heirman, Vinaya, 194-195.
51 In a way, it would have been like banning the poor from becoming monks, while monks were expected to live in 
poverty.
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regime granting tax immunity to all clergies were the Mongols.52 Alternatively, the rule may 
have countenanced a scenario where one would seek monastic ordination before becoming 
a taxpayer, or after ceasing to be one. None of this makes much sense in China, however, 
and the likelihood is that the clause barring tax-evaders from admission into the saṃgha 
simply gave a perfunctory cue of disapproval to a state of things that, however widespread 
and indeed unavoidable, would lack any official sanction. Whether such a rule could ever be 
applied in practice was in fact entirely contingent upon the absence of a universal system of 
taxation, or of the state’s ability to enforce it: this is a crucial issue to which I return below. A 
similar quandary would engulf any attempt to observe the prohibition, in this case attested in 
all the vinayas, for soldiers to become Buddhist monks: it could probably work in a state with 
an elite mercenary army, much less in one recruiting its military through conscription or 
large-scale enlistment, such as the territorial soldiery established at the end of the Northern 
dynasties and in the early Tang.53 
May I repeat myself at this point: let’s not take any exemption for granted. The disciplin-
ary codes translated in the fifth century, on the eve of the first major confrontation between 
Buddhism and the state in China, would set a normative template for a regular clergy whose 
existence was still largely theoretical. But if these very codes could not spell out a clear stance 
on fiscal and penal immunity, why should we expect the ruling elites to have warranted what 
the monastic elites were unable to ask?
Scattered evidence from the period of disunion should accordingly be read afresh, and 
without prejudice. In the south we should note a document by Xun Ji 荀濟 (d. 547), a ve-
hement critic of the pro-Buddhist policies of emperor Wu 武 of the Liang 梁 (r. 502–549). 
Xun notes that »monks come from the poor, and they scheme to avoid taxes and corvées« 
(僧出寒微, 規免租役).54 His wording suggests that, while monastic status may have offered 
loopholes to evade fiscal duties, it granted no legal exemption as such. 55 In the north, an 
apocryphal Chinese sūtra probably dating from the early sixth century voices the distress 
of its surely monastic author at the vexing levies that state authorities were forcing on the 
52 The Mongols, of course, did not lack their own taxation systems and, in time, tended to adopt many of those of 
the sedentary peoples they had conquered, including the Chinese. However, they relied on requisitions and extra-
ordinary levies far more than they were able to develop forms of regular tribute. Compare Schurmann, Mongolian 
tributary practices, and Smith, Mongol and Nomadic Taxation, two classic studies respectively stressing the for-
mer and the latter aspect.
53 On this territorial army, the so-called fubing 府兵, see Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 189-193 and passim.
54 See Guang hongming ji (T vol. 52 no. 2103), 130c6-7. A nearly complete translation of Xun Ji’s memorial is in Ch’en, 
Anti-Buddhist Propaganda, 184-192; see also the discussion in Strange, Representations of Liang Emperor Wu, 
67-77.
55 Kenneth Ch’en translates the key phrase guimian zuyi 規免租役 as »according to the law, they are exempt from 
taxation« (Anti-Buddhist Propaganda, 189). This is wrong: the term gui 規 can also mean a ›rule‹, although it would 
be unusual for state regulations, but in the present passage it must have the alternative meaning ›to scheme‹; in 
fact, the compound guimian 規免 is well attested in medieval Chinese in the sense of ›finding ways to avoid [some-
thing unwanted]‹, see Luo, Hanyu da cidian, vol. 10, 324. Cf. a nearly identical phrase within a passage in the Sui 
shu (24.681), describing a situation of widespread tax evasion in the Shandong area in the early years of the Sui 
dynasty (the 580s): »Out of every ten people, the layabouts dodging corvée duties were six or seven. There were 
slackers everywhere, some pretending to be old and some young, scheming so as not to pay taxes« 避役惰遊者十
六七。四方疲人, 或詐老詐小, 規免租賦. Briefly, and it is no minor difference, what Xun Ji complains about is mo-
nastic tax evasion, not tax exemption.
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saṃgha.56 On the other hand, an anonymous memorial submitted in 486 under the Northern 
Wei complains that, after the introduction of monastic registration, people had been trying 
to take advantage of it as they would »falsely claim to have entered the path in order to avoid 
paying taxes« (假稱入道以避輸課).57 A similar grievance will be raised several decades lat-
er: in the Wei shu 魏書 (ca. 554), the historian remarks that after the Zhengguang 正光 era 
(520–525), as the state authorities were increasingly imposing conscription to face a general 
crisis, »locally registered people would associate with those who have entered the path on the 
pretence that they revere the śramaṇas, but in fact to avoid taxes and corvées« (所在編民, 相
與入道, 假慕沙門, 實避調役).58 These documents stop short of admitting unambiguously that 
monks were exempt, but they do reinforce a view of the monastery as a tax haven of choice 
for fiscally battered populations. The big claim finally comes in 570 and again in the north, 
just before the second great proscription of Buddhism, although the source is not entirely 
unbiased: a lay apologist for the saṃgha brags that Buddhist monks, unlike Taoist priests, do 
not serve as soldiers or pay in-kind taxes (zu 租), and enjoy such exemptions because they 
are ultimately of royal stock.59 Yet, a nearly contemporary document puts this boast in cont-
ext. In 567, at the same northern court, the maverick monk Wei Yuansong 衛元嵩 (d.u.) had 
plead ed for sweeping religious reformation, denouncing the corruption of the clergy. One 
of his proposals was that unseemly rich monks be made to pay an exemption tax: »if wealthy 
monks pay a tax to be exempted from fiscal liability (ding 丁), then all monks will certainly 
disdain ceasing to pay taxes, and will strive to check stinginess and greed« 富僧輸課免丁, 則
諸僧必望停課, 爭斷慳貪.60 Wei’s request conveys that while the monastic elite indeed enjo-
yed fiscal privileges, avoiding taxation was more of an endeavour for the larger mass of the 
saṃgha, which could be put off it as long as an example was set with their most powerful 
members.
56 See Xiangfa jueyi jing (T vol. 85 no. 2870), 1337b16-23; Tokuno, Book of Resolving Doubts, gives an introduc-
tion and a full translation of this text (the passage on the taxation of the clergy is at 266-267). For the date of the 
scripture, see Lai, Dating; although Lai’s attempt to anchor the authorship of the sūtra to a specific time and place 
(Luoyang, AD 517-520) is fragile, he convincingly argues that the text polemically reflects the situation of Bud-
dhism under the Northern Wei in the early decades of the sixth century. Cf. also the brief discussions in Gernet, 
Buddhism in Chinese Society, 25 and 48 (Gernet, however, misdates the sūtra to the late Tang period).
57 Monastic authorities were accordingly asked to perform a scrutiny of the clergy, which resulted in a rather negli-
gible 1,327 monastics being defrocked (slightly less than 2% of the total monastic population in the census of 477). 
See Wei shu, 114.3039; Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 79-80; cf. Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 38.
58 Wei shu, 114.3048; the comment is given as background to the sensational figure of two million monks and nuns 
in this period, which I have discussed above. The word for ›taxes‹ here is diao 調, which more specifically refers to 
a levy paid in fabrics: see Twitchett, Financial Administration, 2, 208 n. 10. Cf. the slightly different translations of 
this passage in Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 103, and Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 38, who both misunder-
stand the key phrase xiangyu rudao 相與入道. On the Northern Wei crisis providing the context for these remarks, 
see the excellent analysis in Pearce, Yü-Wen Regime, 146-179.
59 This was mathematician and calendar expert Zhen Luan 甄鸞 (fl. 535-570) in his Xiao Dao lun 笑道論, a corrosive 
lampoon of the Taoists that caused a stir at the Northern Zhou 周 court in Chang’an 長安: see Guang hongming ji (T 
vol. 52 no. 2103), 146c22-24. For a full study and translation of this text see Kohn, Laughing at the Tao (p. 82 for the 
passage in question). We have seen above that from the late fourth century, Buddhist monks in China had adopted 
the common surname Śākya and thus made themselves into kinsmen of the Buddha, whose royalty is alluded to in 
Zhen Luan’s claim.
60 Guang hongming ji (T vol. 52 no. 2103), 132b11-14; cf. Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 32, for a very different 
understanding of this passage. The term ding 丁 referred to a male adult liable for tax and corvée labour, and was 
also used by synecdoche for the latter in particular; see Pearce, Yü-Wen Regime, 513, 516-518. On Wei Yuansong, 
traditionally seen as an instigator of the suppression of Buddhism under the Northern Zhou, see Ch’en, Buddhism 
in China, 187-190; Tsukamoto, Hoku Shū no haibutsu, 490-510.
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The foregoing evidence is doubtless contradictory, and inconclusive at best: only a very 
selective reading of the sources can warrant the conclusion, currently held by several Chi-
nese scholars, that tax immunity was the rule for Buddhist monks during the period of divi-
sion.61 Moroto Tatsuo 諸戸 立雄, who has studied the issue of monastic taxation in medieval 
China in some detail, acknowledges that things are none too clear before the Tang: monks 
were not on ordinary household registers, but if they were probably excluded from individual 
imposition (most certainly from corvée labour), their estates may have been taxed never-
theless, something which becomes more certain after the fiscal reforms of the late eighth 
century.62 Nor can such a clear-cut line be drawn at this stage between the regular saṃgha 
and the registered population, for the latter, as we have seen, could suddenly swell the ranks 
of the former. Between the two worlds, especially in the north, there was in fact an extensive 
grey zone of rural monasticism, deeply rooted in the local society and often populated by 
hybrid figures of monastic householders and peasants, more similar to the married monks 
of Kroraina than to the role models in the vinayas and the urban clergy.63 Tackling this phe-
nomenon, which had no clear equivalent in the south, was thus tantamount to substantially 
extending the fiscal reach and economic basis of the state.64 The northern regimes, as we are 
going to see, would rise to this challenge with remarkable success, rewriting the rules of the 
imperial game in the process.
The fall and fall of the tributary state
Two preliminary conclusions can probably be drawn from our discussion so far. The first is 
that forms of exemption for the Buddhist clergy did exist in China during the period of di-
vision, but rather de facto than de jure. Evidence of taxation is consistent with this scenario 
and should not be construed as an exception to a rule: there was no rule. The second point 
is that whatever privilege there was, it appears to have descended, initially at least, less from 
the dubious charisma of the monks than from the sacred aura of the Buddha-shrines; com-
munities established within the hallowed precincts of the buddhas would apparently acquire 
some of their immunities, and this would also explain why, for a long time, those escaping 
jail or conscription would flock to them. 
To discern a meaningful image in this hazy picture, however, we may need to stand back 
and consider the broader setting. The word ›exemption‹, in particular, should be used with 
some caution, for as soon as we use it to refer to the state’s withdrawal from demands im-
posed on some of its subjects, we are already assuming an absolute power of that state to im-
61 See, for example, Xie, Tangdai siyuan sengni mianfu, 66; Zhang and Liu, Han Tang zhi ji Fojiao, 129-130. These 
scholars, however, agree that forms of taxation of the clergy were present already during the Tang period.
62 Moroto, Chūgoku Bukkyō, 337–443, especially 403–406, 434–437. Note that Gernet, whose longue durée nar-
rative hops back and forth between different centuries and regimes, settles at one point on a similar conclusion 
(Buddhism in Chinese Society, 43).
63 On rural Buddhism under the Northern dynasties, see Hou, Wu–liu shiji beifang minzhong Fojiao xinyang, and Liu, 
Art, Ritual, and Society. On irregular monks see Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 37-43 (although his thesis 
that the expression rudao 入道 refers to such ›lay monks‹ does not seem to have ground). The best evidence on 
rural monasticism in medieval China is unfortunately concentrated in the northwestern periphery (Dunhuang) 
and at a later period (ninth-tenth centuries); for an extensive discussion, see Hao, Tang houqi (partly summed 
up, with further materials, in Hao, Social Life). Cf. Ashkenazi, Holy Man versus Monk, for the significance of this 
phenomenon on the other side of the Late Antique oikoumene.
64 Epigraphic evidence for the period of division suggests a far more limited rural penetration of Buddhism in 
southern China, where, despite aristocratic patronage of the clergy in the main metropolitan centres, the alliance 
between court and local elites appears to have stifled everything in between; see Liu, Return of the State.
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pose and exact those demands. This may well be what a state is about, monopoly of violence 
and all, but if so, here is another word that invites prudence. For in Late Antique China at 
least, the various ›states‹ that contested its territory simply did not have that power.65 
A degree of functional weakness, especially in fiscal matters, had been connatural with the 
Chinese imperial formation almost from the outset. The Han dynasty had survived for centu-
ries on a regime of low land tax, not out of frugality, but to avoid both the empowerment of 
collectors in the provinces and a fiscal overload that would have quickly eroded the tax base. 
The bulk of the peasantry who were not landowners were in any case already ground down 
under the heavy rents owed to their landlords, which included the court itself.66 There was 
also a poll tax cashed from across the empire, but the government chiefly relied on its own 
demesnes and on tributary resources from the region around the capital rather than from the 
broader territory; provisioning that area was therefore key to maintaining the sway of the 
imperial centre over the periphery.67 Taking these and other aspects into account, Andrew 
Eisenberg has described the premodern Chinese polity in Weberian terms as a patrimonial 
regime in which a single extended household ruling from a royal court exerted varying de-
grees of military and fiscal coercion over semi-autonomous local elites acknowledging its 
suzerainty.68 In Eisenberg’s effective characterization, the fulcrum of this deliberately in-
efficient power structure »was essentially a regionally based garrison regime with tentative 
ties to its provinces«.69 
However, the inherent, long-term limitations of the imperial formation in China should 
not obscure the epic dimensions of its collapse in the Late Antique transition. Demographic 
data are a sobering token of this shift. In the second century AD, the Han empire, Rome’s 
twin in eastern Eurasia, ran several censuses giving returns between 9.2 and 10.8 million 
households with 47.6 to 56.5 million individuals.70 One century later, however, the three 
kingdoms that took its place could only count 1,473,433 households and 7,672,881 indivi-
duals altogether.71 Comparably low population figures are randomly recorded throughout 
the age of division, especially in the south.72 What happened? Since neither bubonic plagues 
65 A significant strand of contemporary political theory is indeed unwilling to consider premodern empires as ›states‹ 
at all, reserving the term instead for the polities defined by sovereignty and mutually exclusive territoriality that 
emerged in Europe from the end of the Middle Ages (and to those later following their model): see, for example, 
Kratochwil, Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality; Spruyt, Sovereign State and Its Competitors. This view 
clearly has merit, not least here because it bears on the problematic historical relationship between modern China 
and its imperial predecessors. Many of its assumptions, however, sit rather uncomfortably with evidence from 
outside premodern Europe, something which would warrant fuller discussion elsewhere. In the present context I 
will keep to a minimal definition of ›state‹ as any political organization making absolute claims over territory and 
people, with further qualifications in the discussion below.
66 The land tax amounted to a paltry thirtieth of the crop through most of the Han dynasty, but rents varied between 
a half and two thirds, depending on whether peasants had to borrow oxen, seeds, and implements from their land-
lords. See Crowell, Government Land Policies, 87-92, 105-113.
67 See Nishijima, Economic and Social History, 597-598; Ebrey, Economic and Social History, 617-622; Lewis, Early 
Imperial China, 289-298; cf. Deng, Imperial China, 313-314.
68 See Eisenberg, Weberian Patrimonialism, and Eisenberg, Kingship, 1-21. 
69 Eisenberg, Weberian Patrimonialism, 97. 
70 See the table in Bielenstein, Chinese Historical Demography, 12, and the discussion in Tang, San lun, 83-105.
71 See Tongdian, 7.145.
72 See Bielenstein, Chinese Historical Demography, 16-19.
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nor nuclear bombings are attested in China in this period,73 we can agree in principle with 
Nishijima Sadao (and many others) that these tallies should rather be seen as proxies for 
»the actual number of individuals on whom the state could lay hands and who were subject 
to taxation and labor service.«74 Behind this demographic debacle, then, there would have 
been the sustained failure of the Late Antique regimes that replaced the Han, both alien and 
Sinitic, to do their basic job, to count and tax people. 
Here again Chinese history appears to run on a parallel track to the Western end of the Old 
World, for there too one observes a similar waning of the fiscal reach of the state in the col-
lapsing Roman empire, followed by the advent of smaller polities under Romano- Germanic 
rulers that were unable or unwilling to enforce taxation, and relied instead on the lands they 
could directly control. Chris Wickham has explained this transition in Marxian terms as one 
involving two competing modes of production: a tributary mode, in which a strong state 
drawing resources from taxation could enjoy a large degree of autonomy from and power 
over local elites, and a feudal mode where a weak state was instead beholden to rent-taking 
aristocracies. Both modes could coexist within the same polities, but while the tributary state 
seemingly managed to survive and endure in China and other premodern Asian empires, it 
vanished in the West, where land and rent defined the early Middle Ages.75 Walter Scheidel 
has then built on Wickham’s metanarrative to refine his thesis of a ›First Great Divergence‹, 
presenting the return of a unified empire in China at the end of the sixth century as a resur-
gence of the ›strong tributary state‹, heralded by a significant rise of population counts in the 
north after the demographic eclipse of the post-Han period.76
Seductively elegant though they are, these models fit China’s Late Antiquity only im-
perfectly. We should note in the first place that low census figures do not necessarily imply 
a demise of the state, nor rising demographic tallies its strengthening. In the third century, 
for example, the two regional kingdoms of Shu Han 蜀漢 (221–263) in the west and Wu 吳 
(222–280) in the south were able to maintain impressive bureaucracies against dramatically 
73 I have left this cheeky remark from the conference paper, but in the meantime Morelli et al., Yersinia pestis, came 
to my notice. Their discovery, based on cutting-edge genome sequencing techniques, that the bacterial agent of 
plague probably »evolved in or near China« more than 2,600 years ago casts a sinister light on repeated but va-
gue reports of epidemics in Chinese historical sources. Cf., however, the different responses of plague historians 
to their conclusions in Little, Plague Historians in Lab Coats, and Benedictow, Yersinia pestis. At present, the 
earliest certain instance of the bubonic plague (now also confirmed through historical DNA testing) remains the 
Justinianic Pandemic that spread in the Eastern Mediterranean and its inlands from the sixth century AD, whereas 
Chinese literary evidence does not suggest any comparable episode for scale and symptoms before this outbreak. 
This is not to deny the probable role of epidemics in Chinese demographic trends, as I hint below.
74 Nishijima, Economic and Social History, 596. Some scholars have been willing to assume a massive population 
decline, especially from the late third century, on account of natural causes such as war and epidemics (Yang, No-
tes on the Economic History, 114) or a major environmental crisis (Chin, Climate Change and Migrations, 57-59). 
These scenarios are probably relevant to specific demographic fluctuations, but they cannot explain the aggregate 
data nor the long-term trends. Cf. the sensible observations in Bielenstein, Chinese Historical Demography, 13, 
and Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 35-37.
75 See Wickham, Uniqueness of the East (with a focus on China at 172-175), and Framing the Early Middle Ages, 56-62.
76 Scheidel, Fiscal Regimes.
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diminished populations.77 This suggests that, in these vast areas, the number of registered 
households and individuals shrank much faster than the state apparatus that was meant to 
control them. Exogenous factors must have been at play that cannot be discussed in detail 
here, but it is plausible to assume that a real depopulation brought about by famines, epi-
demics, and violence, while it cannot possibly account for the full scale of the demographic 
contraction in this period, may have increased the tax burden beyond bearing for those that 
remained. Faced with a spiral of flight and fiscal disobedience, the still sizeable bureaucracies 
of the post-Han states probably concentrated their efforts on manageable fractions of their 
nominal territories and populations.78
Tellingly, both Shu Han and Wu were eventually overwhelmed by a northern regime 
whose own crippled demographics did not prevent it from deploying large armies and 
achiev ing a short-lived reunification of China. Since the 190s, the Cao 曹 clan, which would 
soon rule the north in its own right as the Wei 魏 dynasty (220-266), had effectively address-
ed the fiscal problem by means of state-owned agricultural colonies (tuntian 屯田) manned 
by conscripted civilians. These were removed from the authority of the Board of Revenue and 
accordingly exempted from taxes and corvées, but had to pay a rent of 50-60% of their yield 
to the government.79 The farmers in the colonies were seemingly hidden from censuses, and 
in 263 the Cao Wei state could only count 663,423 households and 4,432,881 individuals, a 
dismal percentage of the north China population under the Eastern Han.80 The system none-
theless produced enough resources to give the northern kingdom, which would switch to 
the Jin 晉 dynasty in 266, a decisive edge over its two rivals.81 One of the first acts of the Jin 
government was to dismantle the special administration of the colonies, and of the colonies 
77 In 263, when Shu Han was defeated and annexed by the Cao Wei 曹魏 kingdom (then ruling in the north), it 
reported a population of 280,000 households and 940,000 individuals, with 40,000 government employees (li 
吏), thus one every 7 households/23.5 individuals. When it was Wu’s turn to be conquered by the north in 280, it 
counted 523,000 households, 2,300,000 individuals, and 32,000 clerks, one every 16.3 households/71.9 indivi-
duals. See respectively Sanguo zhi, 33.900 (comm.) and 48.1177 (comm.). These ratios of administrators against 
population should be compared to the data for the whole Han empire around the time of its demographic peak in 
AD 2 (12,233,062 households, 59,594,978 individuals, see Han shu, 28B.1640); a few years earlier, in 5 BC, there 
is an overall count of 130,285 government employees (see Bielenstein, Bureaucracy of Han Times, 156, 205 n. 1), 
which means a considerably lower ratio of one every 93.9 households/457.4 individuals. Thus the ›weak states‹ 
that succeeded the Han could actually deploy many more clerks as a proportion of the registered population than 
their ›strong‹ predecessor.
78 Recent archaeological evidence from Zoumalou 走馬樓 at Changsha 長沙, Hunan has offered a snapshot of 
heavy taxation and tight governmental control of the population in a single district in the southern kingdom of 
Wu during the period AD 232-238 (for a good overview, see Lu, Managing Locality). This cannot have been the 
norm across the entire territory, as it does not fit the bigger picture of the period. Describing the situation in the 
Northeast a few decades earlier, a contemporary observer also notes that the few left on the household registers 
were made to pay considerably more tax than was their due: see the quotation from Sima Biao’s 司馬彪 (240-306) 
Jiuzhou chunqiu 九州春秋 at Sanguo zhi, 6.195 (commentary).
79 See Nishijima, Chūgoku keizaishi kenkyū, 297-379; Crowell, Government Land Policies, 151-171. This Wei dynasty of 
the (Chinese) Cao clan should not be confused with the (non-Chinese) Northern Wei (386-534) discussed above 
and again below.
80 See Tongdian, 7.145.
81 Shu Han was conquered in 263, and Wu in 280; see above, note 77.
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themselves once the conquest of the south was completed in 280.82 The former measure must 
have involved a registration of the previous state tenants, for we see a demographic spike at 
this point, with the population in the north appearing to increase nearly fourfold in less than 
two decades, albeit still tallying well below the Eastern Han records.83 But if the newly uni-
fied Jin empire toyed with the idea of bringing back a proper tributary state, it failed miser-
ably: its land policies to this effect remained a dead letter, and within a single generation the 
empire itself disintegrated again, this time for a much longer break.84 
This overview warrants some adjustment to the Wickham/Scheidel model. A ›strong 
state‹, with enough resources and soldiers to successfully entertain imperial ambitions, 
could subsist as a militarized rent-taking landlord, whilst relinquishing much of its tributary 
prerogatives and census scope. Less successfully, it could still linger on in patches, with its 
bureaucracies ganging up on the easier bits of the tax base. Conversely, the rapid expansion 
of population registration that ushered in the Jin reunification in the second half of the third 
century did not result in a stable tributary empire. I shall briefly explore below some of the 
reasons behind this failure, but two quick observations are in order. One is that ever since the 
long decline of the Han dynasty, no fiscal leviathan was in place to restrain the emergence of 
social and political actors that could compete with the patrimonial centre, or simply ignore 
its demands. More importantly, however, even in the glory days of the tributary empire, 
taxation may have been less about the extraction of revenue than it was about the assertion 
of territorial suzerainty, a ritual measure of the extent to which the centre could command 
compliance from the periphery: through periodical intimidation no doubt, but also through 
the exercise of an imperial authority that would encompass what we parse as the economic, 
political, and religious spheres – what I call the metapolitical order.85 It is this order that 
collapsed in the Late Antique transition; it is its reconstitution that local elites and Buddhist 
communities would challenge from different perspectives.
82 The separate administration for the agricultural colonies was abolished first in 264, at the very end of the Cao 
Wei, when the government was already firmly in the hands of the Sima 司馬 clan that would soon establish the 
Jin dynasty; it was then confirmed in 266 in the name of the new regime. See Sanguo zhi, 4.153 and Jin shu, 3.55. 
For the conclusion that the colonies survived the change of jurisdiction until around 280, I rely on the analysis in 
Crowell, Government Land Policies, 167-168, 183-187.
83 We go from 663,423 households for the Cao Wei only in 263 to 3,770,000 households for the unified empire in 282 
(see Sanguo zhi, 22.636, comm.). If we deduct from the latter figure the 280,000 households added from Shu Han 
in 263 and the 523,000 households from Wu in 280 (above, note 77), we have a spectacular increase of 2,303,577 
households over this short period. Tang Changru (Clients and Bound Retainers, 117-118) also notes this demogra-
phic expansion, although with more conservative figures based on a Jin census in 280, and links it to scattered 
evidence of stricter controls on registration evasion in northern China at the time. However, a simpler explanation 
is that the increase came from the registration of households previously under the separate administration for 
agricultural colonies.
84 See Yang, Notes on the Economic History, 166-169 (translating a traditional account) and the focused discussion 
in Crowell, Government Land Policies, 183-205.
85 This suggestion will probably be anathema to Wickham’s analysis, although it is not necessarily in contrast with it 
to assume, as I do, that the tributary reach was an expression of imperial suzerain power rather than its basis.
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The former, emboldened by the implosion of the centre, would progressively gain con-
fidence in advancing an alternative view of society, where status no longer descended from 
service to the state – at least not only or even chiefly – but from birth into a local commu-
nity with its hierarchies, and clientship into one replaced allegiance to the other.86 Forms of 
manorialism, in which helpless peasantries running away from a crumbling administration 
would cluster around the fortress of some provincial magnate, had been spreading ever since 
the troubles at the end of the Han. However, it was especially from the early fourth century, 
after the Jin lost control of the north under nomadic pressure, that the territorial power of 
the great local clans became entrenched. Strong enough to shield themselves and their large 
numbers of retainer households from the fiscal demands of the state, they effectively stall-
ed any attempt at a recovery of the tributary empire.87 In the south, the trend would prove 
irreversible, as the increasingly short-lived dynasties ruling from Jiankang 建康 – hobbled 
between the centrifugal agency of the aristocracy and waves of northern émigrés that per-
sistently shirked registration – could never reach an effective control of their populations.88
Buddhism in the fiscal resurgence of the northern regimes
The great clans that remained in the north China plain after it fell to Central and Inner Asian 
tribes soon negotiated similar privileges with the new rulers, who were more than willing to 
use their services to squeeze surplus from the peasantry.89 Some of these ›barbarian‹ leaders, 
and to a lesser extent their peoples, were in fact already partly Sinicized; the volatile polities 
they established match most of the features of other post-nomadic states set by pastoralists 
who gradually abandon their lifestyle and economy in territories that are not suitable to 
them, often ruling in »an almost permanent state of military mobilisation« and without a 
stable institutional framework.90 Despite attempts to install Chinese-style bureaucracies that 
could control the population, these regimes generally ruled by might, and regularly resorted 
to heavy-handed relocations of war captives and peasant households to support their power 
bases.91 This was initially also the case for the Xianbei tribe of the Tuoba 拓拔, who would 
found the (Northern) Wei 魏 dynasty (386-534) at the end of the fourth century, and finally 
86 The point is well made in Pearce, Status, Labor, and Law, 107-108.
87 On this problem see, among others, Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past, 34-44; Tang, Clients and Bound Retainers; 
Tang, San lun, 23-39.
88 See Ochi, Nanchō no koseki mondai; Crowell, Northern Émigrés; Tang, San lun, 83-94.
89 See Tang, Clients and Bound Retainers, 122-124.
90 I borrow these definitions and the quote from Wink, Post-Nomadic Empires, 120, 128. On the Sinicization of the 
nomadic elites in the north China plain, see Honey, Sinification and legitimation. 
91 See Nishimura, Chūgoku keizaishi, 92-106; Tang, San lun, 115-118. These states could occasionally show tributary 
capacities. The Former Yan 前燕 kingdom (337-370) established by the Murong 慕容 branch of the Xianbei in an 
area between modern Beijing and the Liaodong region, but stretching south into the Central Plain in its final years, 
by the time of its defeat by the Former Qin 前秦 in 370, was able to count 2,458,969 households and 9,987,935 
individuals distributed over 157 commanderies and 1,579 districts; see Jin shu, 113.2893. This was nearly as much 
as the census records for the unified Jin empire, covering a much larger territory, in 280. Tang Changru (San 
lun, 94-99) links the Former Yan (isolated) demographic exploit to a tightening of registration control after 360; 
Kenneth Klein, however, remarks that the Murong success in establishing an agrarian state in the northeast could 
benefit from somewhat exceptional environmental circumstances, a »dual insulation – from the pressures of the 
Central Plain and of the Mongolian steppe« as well as a limited presence of large landholders (Contribution of the 
Fourth Century Xianbei, 28-29).
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impose their supremacy over all of northern China in 439.92 A few years later, as we saw, 
their emperor would order the first great persecution of the Buddhist clergy.93 What we did 
not mention is that at this stage, fearsome and ruthless though they doubtlessly were, these 
Xianbei lords of the north were still clumsy greenhorns in the complexities of a bureaucratic 
state – bulls in a China shop, as it were. Semi-permanent warfare and booty distribution 
were the main glues sticking their fractious elite together, but the very consolidation of con-
quest set a timer on this expedient for stability.94 They also lacked a professional administra-
tion, as their officials did not receive salaries, but were allowed to grab what they could from 
their bailiwicks.95 Such a system evidently could not be either popular or efficient: frequent 
tax holidays granted in the early reigns of the dynasty surely were not acts of generosity, 
but acknowledgments of the difficulties of regular collection and the necessity to mollify an 
exasperated populace.96 To control the local communities, the government had to rely on the 
heads of the great clans, who, exactly like their far more powerful counterparts in the south, 
could thus hide large numbers of dependent households.97 
Yet, it was this very same improbable regime, on the mere survival of which any wager 
would have seemed foolhardy after so many nomadic meteors had flickered out of the north 
China sky, that in the latter half of the fifth century contrived to reinvent itself as the strong-
est tributary state since the Han, and lay the foundations for the return of a unified empire 
one century later. Under Emperor Xiaowen 孝文帝 (r. 471–499), a sweeping series of mea-
sures dramatically enhanced the fiscal and political authority of the Northern Wei central 
government and its ability to lead an agrarian society. From 473 inspectors were sent across 
provinces and districts to enforce household registration and ferret out hidden dependents 
and absconders.98 In 484 fixed salaries funded by tax income at last were introduced for state 
officials.99 One year later, a groundbreaking new policy known as the ›Equal Field‹ (juntian 
均田) created firm rules for tax liability and land allocation under government supervision
92 On the background of the Tuoba Xianbei and the rise of the Northern Wei empire, see Klein, Contribution of the 
Fourth Century Xianbei, and Holcombe, Xianbei in Chinese History, 15-22, with further references.
93 See above, p. 124
94 See Eisenberg, Warfare and Political Stability. Klein (Contribution of the Fourth Century Xianbei, 115-116, 192-194 
n. 32) charts all instances of booty distribution under the Northern Wei and notes their sharp drop after the mid-
fifth century. Here my analysis expands on Pearce, Yü-Wen Regime, 47-48.
95 See e.g. Wei shu, 24.625.
96 See Klein, Contribution of the Fourth Century Xianbei, 114-115 and 191-192 n. 29.
97 The system was known as ›Supervision and Protection by Lineage Heads‹ (zongzhu duhu 宗主督護): see Wei shu, 
110.2855; Tongdian, 3.61; cf. Gao, Bei Wei zongzhu duhu.
98 Wei shu, 7A.139, 42.954, 51.1129.
99 Wei shu, 7A.153-154. Two years later, the salaries of local administrators were indexed to the population in their 
bailiwicks, thus indirectly promoting census surveillance (Wei shu, 7B.161).
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that would shape the agrarian state for the next three centuries to come.100 To support its 
implementation and stamp out registration fraud, critical synergies were established with 
the local communities.101 Some of these measures, notably the ›Equal Field‹, were expressly 
meant to promote agriculture through the maximization of land cultivation, and curb the 
engrossment of arable land at the hands of the powerful clans. While the latter objective is 
unlikely to have been fully achieved or even pursued, the reforms did assert the government’s 
exclusive right over land and population across every inch of territory, and with it the idea 
that service to the state was the only legitimate source of economic status.102 The suzerain 
ideal was back.
Once the new tributary foundations of the Northern Wei regime were in place, a spate of 
edicts in the 490s finally put some heavy Chinese make-up on its post-nomadic face, forcing 
Chinese customs and surnames on its elite, and moving the capital south from Pingcheng 平
城, at the edge of the steppe, to Luoyang 洛陽 in the Central Plain, where Han and Jin mon-
archs had once ruled over a unified empire.103
These developments are remarkable enough in themselves; seen against the trajectory 
of Buddhism in the same period, however, they present us with a gaping paradox, at least if 
we hold to the deep-seated view of monasticism as a major source of strain on the tributary 
state.104 For we have seen that the second half of the fifth century was also when the Buddhist 
community and a monastic economy grew impetuously in northern China, with the prolifer-
ation of religious establishments that claimed immunities for their residents, on account of 
an altogether different brand of holiness from the one set in the imperial tradition: faced 
with a centrifugal force of this magnitude, with the great clans still riding roughshod over its 
fiscal demands and in the absence of an efficient bureaucracy, the Northern Wei state should 
rather have had a hard time staying afloat, never mind becoming so much stronger. But this 
is not what happened, and it bears wondering whether a very different dynamic, however 
counterintuitive, may have been at work in this transition.
It is certain that, within a single generation, the Northern Wei rulers conceived and de-
ployed the two fundamental attitudes the Chinese state would countenance in its confronta-
tion with Buddhism during the following five hundred years: a frontal assault with spoliation 
versus tight regulation and control (stripping or strapping, one might say). The great perse-
cution of 446 was virulent in its rhetoric and violent in its execution, but whatever else may
100 See Wei shu, 7A.156, with the full text of the edict at 110.2853-55. See also the memorial by Li Anshi 李安世 (d.u.) 
(Wei shu, 53.1176; tr. in Twitchett, Financial Administration, 210-211), which is said to have inspired the policy. 
Under the new rules, male and female adults (married couples in later versions) replaced the household (hu 戶), 
by now a screen for hidden retainers, as the basic taxable unit; they received fixed amounts of land from the state, 
with an obligation to farm it and pay in-kind taxes on it until the end of their working lives, at which point they 
would return their allotments. The policy also established land allocations for official post-holders, to be returned 
at the end of tenure. The most comprehensive treatment of the ›Equal Field‹ system and its background is probably 
still Hori, Kindensei no kenkyū; see also Crowell, Government Land Policies, 305-317. The overview in Twitchett, 
Financial Administration, 1-11, shows well the continuity of the system into the Tang period.
101 This was done in 486 by putting ›Three Chiefs‹ (sanzhang 三張) – chosen from local elders respectively at neigh-
bourhood, hamlet, and ward level – in charge of supervising tax and corvée registration in collaboration with the 
state authorities. See Wei shu, 7B.161, 110.2855, and 42.954.
102 Cf. the observations in Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past, 48-50.
103 On these Sinicizing edicts see Lu, Cong Pingcheng dao Luoyang, 149-194, and the discussion in Holcombe, Xianbei 
in Chinese History, 24-28, noting the persistence of Xianbei traits in the ruling strata after the reforms.
104 A typical expression of this view is the account in Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 29-62.
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have inspired it, it was launched after the last conquest in the north had stalled the Tuoba 
juggernaut and caused a dangerous lull in the previously regular distribution of booty.105 If 
the great raid on the monasteries was really addressing a crisis in the traditional nomadic 
economy of predation, it must be significant that the main opponent of that raid and par-
tisan of Buddhism in court circles, the Crown Prince Tuoba Huang 拓拔晃 (428-451), was 
also the one who, in those same years and circles, was championing a full-scale conversion 
to an agrarian economy, involving accurate land surveys and registration of the peasantry.106 
These advocacies may or may not have been linked in the eyes of the young prince, but there 
is room to speculate that a growing segment of the Northern Wei elite would see Buddhism 
as an opportunity for a radical transformation of the state rather than an internal surrogate 
for the vanishing foe to plunder. In this respect, the imperfect synchronism between the 
controlled revival of Buddhism and the agrarian turn in the second half of the fifth century 
should give us pause for thought. It is not the case that an already well-oiled bureaucratic 
machine caught the monastic community in its cogs, as we might be tempted to assume 
with hindsight from later dynasties that yet built on the Northern Wei experience. It seems, 
instead, that the policies mandating the registration of the clergy and the creation of mona-
stic administrators preceded the great wave of census control and the professionalization of 
the officialdom, or at best, they unfolded in parallel.107 And it is, again, simply not true that 
a clear fiscal apparatus and policies were already in place that could define tax liabilities or 
exemptions for the Buddhist monks. It seems, instead, that ad hoc forms of land tenure for 
monasteries such as the buddha and saṃgha households were introduced before effective 
regulations on land and taxation were devised for the commoners.108 
It almost looks as though the Tuoba government was testing its ability to count, tax, sur-
vey and control people and territory on the Buddhist clergy before tackling the big target.109 
105 The chart with a timeline of booty distribution on p. 115 of Klein, Contribution of the Fourth Century Xianbei, 
speaks for itself. From the detailed breakdown on pp. 192-194 n. 32, we can see that until 434, loot sharing among 
Tuoba generals after military victories took place at least once a year, but from then and until 447 there was a 
single instance following the conquest of the Northern Liang 涼 in 439. In this light it is probably relevant that the 
persecution of 446 was unleashed in the course of a military expedition against rebels in the area of Chang’an, and 
triggered by a charge of involvement in the rebellion against local monks; see Wei shu, 114.3033-34; cf. Hurvitz 
(trans.), Wei Shou, 64-65.
106 See Wei shu, 4B.108-109; Zizhi tongjian, 124.3902; Nishimura, Chūgoku keizaishi, 106–112; cf. Crowell, Govern-
ment Land Policies, 302-304. On Tuoba Huang’s Buddhist faith and his protection of the clergy during the perse-
cution, see Wei shu, 114.3034-35; cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 66, 68-69. The economic activism of the prince 
(regularly mentioned under his post humous name Gongzong 恭宗 in the sources) drew sharp criticism from Chi-
nese courtiers: see Wei shu, 48.1071-72; cf. Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past, 46.
107 The first census figures for the clergy date from 477, but in 472 an edict was banning the circulation of ›un register-
ed monks‹ (wuji zhi seng 無籍之僧), implying that registration already existed then; see Wei shu, 114.3038; cf. 
Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 76. This edict was issued at the beginning of Xiaowendi’s reign, within weeks from 
another one formally encouraging the expansion of agriculture (Wei shu, 4A.137), a starting shot for the series of 
major policies discussed above. On monastic administrators, see above, note 30.
108 Cf. pp. 125 and 137 above. Tsukamoto (Hoku Gi sōgiko – buttoko, 112-120) suggests a date between 469 and 476 
for the establishment of the buddha and saṃgha households.
109 In some cases, a specific connection seems clear. In 488, in order to further strengthen the income base for 
the govern ment, a proposal was successfully passed to establish state-owned farms, no doubt following the dis-
tant model of the Cao Wei agricultural colonies; see Wei shu, 62.1385-86, 110.2856-57. The taxation rate of sixty 
bushels of grain for these farms, however, was identical to that of the earlier saṃgha households, as noted in Tang, 
Clients and Bound Retainers, 124-125.
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But surely there was more to it than that. In an age dominated by locality and birth in 
the definition of an individual’s loyalties and obligations, and in which the idea of universal 
empire could no longer find a political referent, the Buddhist community was the only in-
stitution in the real world that had kept some essential traits of that idea – its translocal 
orien tation and its de-emphasis on birth – most visible. Buddhist establishments were lit-
erally everywhere, as once had been the relay stations for the Han imperial couriers and 
envoys, and kept in existence some form of the network of long-distance exchange that a 
large tributary state should have been able to offer.110 Registering the clergy was evidently 
no minor exercise, as it involved having government eyes and hands in nearly every district 
and village, sifting through rural communities where the peasant and the monk often blurred 
into each other, but also poking around the great clans’ turf. These checks should accordingly 
be seen as a major investment in population control and territorial suzerainty, especially if 
the state promoting them was one piously endorsing Buddhism, as the Northern Wei did 
from 453.111
Significantly, it is only after the ›Equal Field‹ policy was introduced – indeed, immedi-
ately after, in 486 – that we come across the first clear reference to people falsely claiming 
monastic status in order to avoid taxation.112 This is presumably because, as Moroto has ob-
served, the new regime linked fiscal duties to land allocation, and monks were not grantees 
under its terms, but were bound to a separate registration from ordinary householders.113 
But even though they were not formally taxpayers now that formal rules did exist, it does not 
follow that monks were thereby sheltered from any exaction, as the state could descend on 
them whenever it saw fit.114 We should not expect a court officially worshipping Buddhism, 
or a monastic elite in cahoots with that court, to leave records of such infringements, but 
grassroots Buddhists had their own samizdat, often in the form of apocryphal sūtras where 
the Buddha was made to utter bleak prophecies about a dystopian future that happened to be 
their present. One such text, already hinted at above, is the ›Scripture on the Resolution of 
Doubts Concerning [the Age of] the Imitation Law‹ (Xiangfa jueyi jing 像法決疑經), reflect-
ing conditions in the north around the turn of the sixth century. Here one reads of impious 
state officials »robbing through levies the properties of the saṃgha« (稅奪眾僧物), taxing 
their livestock and grain down to smallest things, and bossing around the serfs (nubi 奴婢) of 
110 On this dimension of Buddhism see Neelis, Early Buddhist Transmission; compare Chris Wickham’s reflections on 
the nexus between taxation and long-distance exchange in the Late Antique Mediterranean (Framing the Early 
Middle Ages, 708-720). Similar analyses with a focus on China are a desideratum. There, the formidable potential 
of the monastic network is best documented in its international dimension, thanks to the travelogues of Chinese 
monks who could rely on it in their pilgrimages to Central Asia and India; most famous in our period is Faxian 法顯 
(d. ca. 423), on whom see Deeg, Gaoseng-Faxian-zhuan. Within medieval China itself, network exchange between 
monasteries is still largely understudied; a preliminary exception that I am aware of is Lu, Zhishi zhi wang.
111 We lack detailed demographic tallies for the Northern Wei period, but a contemporary estimate that toward 520 
the population was double the Jin census count in 280 (for a unified empire) seems credible, also in view of later 
data; see Wei shu, 106A.2455. This would mean no less than five million households in the north alone, as noted 
in Tongdian, 7.146.
112 See above, p. 130 and note 57.
113 See Moroto, Chūgoku Bukkyō, 342-343. Cf. Twitchett, Financial Administration, 208 n. 8.
114 The memorial of 486 making the first connection between bogus monastic registration and tax evasion almost 
seems to threaten as much when it spurns those resorting to this subterfuge as »foolish people trying their luck« 
愚民僥倖; see Wei shu, 114.3039.
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the clergy.115 These grievances appear to bear out our suspicion that the buddha and saṃgha 
households were in fact means for the state to extract revenue from the peasantry through 
the monasteries, even though the latter, at least their leaders, are likely to have received their 
cut and (mostly) lived happily with it. Another apocryphal text from the same background 
(though one that eventually made its way into the orthodox canon thanks to the ambiguities 
of its message) is the ›Scripture for Humane Kings‹ (Renwang jing 仁王經), which voices shrill 
frustration at the Northern Wei state control of the Buddhist community. The Buddha here 
blasts a latter age in which arrogant rulers install superintendents and registrars for the cler-
gy, laypeople take the high seats in monasteries, and conscripts become bhikṣus; he warns 
that monks and nuns who are included in the registers and commanded by state authorities 
are not his disciples, for the law they obey is one for convicts and slaves.116 These snippets 
do not really match the picture of a monastic community offering free rides to crowds of tax 
evaders, and basking in the glories and comforts of an imperial patronage so well attested in 
the records of Buddhism at the new capital Luoyang, or in the elite-sponsored programmes 
of Buddhist statuary and epigraphy at Yungang 雲崗 and Longmen 龍門.117 It is a tale of two 
saṃghas, then, that runs through the revival of the tributary empire: one pampered, the 
other bullied, both finally hanging by a capricious thread spun in court politics.
After fifty years from the reforms that had turned around its power structure, the Northern 
Wei state eventually collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions, notably an un-
resolved conflict between the Sinicized and more conservatively Xianbei strands of its elite, 
and the growing restiveness of its military, once paramount but now largely sidelined. It was 
a revolt of garrisons that, between 524 and 534, dragged the dynasty to its doom and brought 
about its split into two halves under Sino-Xianbei warlord clans, the Yuwen 宇文 in Guanz-
hong and the Gao 高 in Henan and Shandong. These ruled at first through figureheads from 
the deposed dynasty, respectively as the Western Wei (535-557) and Eastern Wei (534-550), 
then in their own right as the Northern Zhou 周 (557-581) and the Northern Qi 齊 (550-
577).118 Both regimes resumed, tweaked and continued the land policies of the Northern 
Wei.119 Their circumstances, however, were radically different, and a showdown was to be 
expected. The eastern state commanded far stronger agricultural resources, pop ulation, and
115 See above, pp. 129-130 and note 56. In Buddhist eschatology, the age of the ›Imitation Law‹ (Ch. xiangfa 像法, 
Skt. saddharma-pratirūpaka) is one in which a debased teaching and practice supersede the correct dharma; some 
traditions placed its onset one thousand years after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, a threshold that, in China, many be-
lieved had just been crossed in the second half of the fifth century (full discussion to appear in Palumbo, Buddhist 
Eschatology and Kingship).
116 See Renwang banruopoluomi jing (T vol. 8 no. 245), 833b19-23, c15-18. This is the original text from the late fifth 
century (an expanded version, heavily influenced by Esoteric Buddhism, would be produced in the eighth century). 
On the Renwang jing see Orzech, Politics and Transcendent Wisdom, especially 107-121 on the historical context of 
the fifth-century version.
117 On the patronage of the Northern Wei aristocracy for the Buddhist caves at Yungang and Longmen, see respecti-
vely Caswell, Written and Unwritten, and McNair, Donors of Longmen. On the apogee of Buddhism at Luoyang in 
the final decades of the dynasty, see Jenner, Memories of Loyang.
118 On these developments see conveniently Lewis, China between Empires, 81-85; Holcombe, Xianbei in Chinese 
History, 28-34; and the extensive treatment in Pearce, Yü-Wen Regime.
119 Indeed, the first direct evidence of the ›Equal Field‹ system comes from the Western Wei, in a document of AD 
547 from the northwestern outpost at Dunhuang. See Twitchett, Financial Administration, 207-208, and Pearce, 
Yü-Wen Regime, 511-518.
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tributary infrastructure; its ruling elite in the Central Plain also inherited the servile house-
holds previously attached to the Northern Wei court, but corruption and factional in stability, 
fuelled by ethnic tensions, were soon to squander much of its advantage.120 The Yuwen re-
gime in the west was an outlier: clinging to the less populated, poorer half of the former 
Tuoba empire, starved of revenue and manpower, it nonetheless rose to the challenge under 
the iron hand of its Xianbei military elite, and through reforms that gained momentum after 
the conquest of Sichuan from the south and a political revamping as the (Northern) Zhou dy-
nasty in the 550s.121 In both states the Buddhist presence was massive, but while the thriving 
economy of the east made room for control-cum-patronage and a functional accommodation 
between the elite and the clergy (much along the lines of the late Northern Wei), severe limit-
ations on resources in the west meant that an appetite for spoliation was always lurking.122 
This is, in fact, what happened in the end. In 574, more than one century after the Northern 
Wei persecution, the Yuwen regime under Wudi 武帝 (r. 560-578) launched a second and 
more radical proscription of Buddhism, this time comparatively subdued in its rhetoric and 
probably also in its violence, but ruthlessly explicit in its aim to appropriate to the state the 
staggering wealth of the saṃgha, and even more its huge reservoir of manpower.123 Ideologi-
cal motivations, of course, were by no means absent, but a major mobilization seems to have 
been the immediate trigger. Only months before the proscription was launched, an edict 
had quashed the traditional Xianbei monopoly of the military and made room for large -scale 
conscription of Chinese commoners, lured with their cancellation from household registers 
and attendant tax and labour duties.124 Defrocking the clergy and returning them en masse 
to those very registers would evidently make up for this shift, or further swell army ranks 
should any laicized monks opt to join them. The ploy tipped the scales in the northern con test 
for power, as it gave the Yuwen regime all the boots on the ground125 it needed to wipe out its 
once formidable eastern rival: Northern Qi was conquered in 577, and the great expropria-
tion of the saṃgha continued there, but on a much grander scale that was commensurate to 
120 Lü, Bei Qi zhengzhi shi yanjiu; Pearce, Status, Labor, and Law. The growing success of population registration un-
der the eastern state is shown in its census records: 2,005,676 households in 550 (Bielenstein, Chinese Historical 
Demography, 18, adding the subtotals in Wei shu, 106A-C), 3,030,000 households in 559-560 (Sui shu, 29.807), 
and a peak of 3,032,528 households and 20,006,880 individuals in 577, at the end of Northern Qi (Zhou shu, 6.101; 
Tongdian, 7.147). Remember, this was just a regional state in the northeast, not a unified Chinese empire.
121 Pearce, Yü-Wen Regime, 474-480; Dien, Role of the Military.
122 See Li, State Religious Policy, 262-266, and Xie, Zhonggu Fojiao sengguan zhidu, 74-86.
123 See Zhou shu, 5.85 for a summary of the proscription edict, which also targeted the Taoists (incomparably less nu-
merous but ideologically influential). At the end of 577, addressing protests from a former monastic leader, Wudi 
would give a matter-of-fact justification for his decision: he had briefly studied Buddhism and found it to be of no 
benefit, hence he abolished it (決知非益, 所以除之); conversely, since the abolition the labour load on the popula-
tion had been lighter, whereas fiscal revenue and troops had been steadily increasing, enabling him to subdue the 
Qi in the east and tribal rebels in the west, all of which was indeed beneficial (事有益). See Guang hongming ji (T 
vol. 52 no. 2103), 154b9-10, c18-20. No trace here of the anti-Buddhist vitriol in the Northern Wei edicts during 
the first persecution: cf. Hurvitz (trans.), Wei Shou, 65-67.
124 See Sui shu, 24.680, noting with a touch of hyperbole that »after this half the Chinese became soldiers« 是後夏人
半為兵矣. Cf. Pearce, Yü-Wen Regime, 668-671; Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 110. Neither scholar makes the 
link with the proscription of Buddhism, and Graff in particular wonders »whether the relatively poor western 
realm would have been able to dispense entirely with the productive labor of more than 100,000 cultivators« (his 
estimate for the Zhou army) – a perplexity we can positively address.
125 In no manner of speaking – the Xianbei did wear boots.
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the size of the Buddhist community in that rich and populous country.126 An estimat ed three 
million monks, nuns, and their dependents were suddenly turned into soldiers and peas-
ants; 40,000 monasteries with their lands, servants and gold changed hands overnight: from 
those emerging from a cloak to the long-nailed fists of the mandarins.127 
The Northern Zhou were now sole lords of a territory larger than the Northern Wei at 
their heyday, since it included Sichuan and even regions south of the Yangzi; it was only a 
matter of time before they could close in on the last monarchic straw man in Jiankang. Wudi, 
however, did not live to see this day, as he died in his prime in 578 (retribution for his evil 
deeds, the Buddhists immediately ruled). The dynasty itself survived him by no more than 
three years, for in 581 one of Wudi’s generals, Yang Jian 楊堅, born and grown in a Buddhist 
nunnery, seized power and established the last of the northern regimes, the Sui 隋 (581-618). 
Even before he formally ascended the throne, one of his first acts was to restore Buddhism; 
then, in 589, Sui troops finally stormed south virtually unopposed, and China was one em-
pire again.128
Conclusion: Fearful symmetries, or the First Great Divergence postponed
I have now reached the margins of my canvas without, I fear, anything resembling a com-
plete picture. Yet, like a pointillist painter, I hope to have at least thrown around enough 
dots that may blend into a meaningful image in the beholder’s eye. My core hypothesis, after 
all, is simple: the confrontation, from the fourth to the sixth centuries, between a rapidly 
growing saṃgha and the alien regimes that ruled northern China may have helped the latter 
to consolidate their state formation, and eventually acquire enough control of territory and 
resources to victoriously launch themselves into the imperial endgame, the conquest of the 
south and a durable unification of ›All under Heaven‹. In their unlikely attempt to cross over 
from predatory leagues of pastoralists to tributary empires, those regimes were soon caught 
in much the same quandary as their Chinese predecessors and competitors since the end 
of the Han: until they could bring the great local clans to heel, and enforce revenue collec-
tion across the length of their nominal realms, their claims to suzerain authority, however 
crowing, would sound persistently hollow. But as long as they failed to command ultimate 
suzerain authority, neither could these sedentarizing nomads dream of turning the skulking 
multitude of their subjects into obliging taxpayers.129 The expansion of the Buddhist monastic
126 On the conquest of Qi, see Pearce, Yü-Wen Regime, 704-720. The extension of the proscription in the east is well 
documented in Buddhist sources, some of which are very close to the facts: see in particular Lidai sanbao ji (T vol. 
49 no. 2034), 83a5 (on the size of the Northern Qi saṃgha), 94b23-28; and Guang hongming ji (T vol. 52 no. 2103), 
153c23-27.
127 For these impressive figures, see the last two sources in the previous note. If they can be trusted, and they probab-
ly can, the monastic community, including the lay devotees and dependents attached to them, would thus have 
been close to 10% of the north China population at the time (for the latter, cf. Xiong, Emperor Yang, 250-252). The 
most thorough discussion of the Northern Zhou persecution of Buddhism to date is still Tsukamoto, Hoku Shū no 
haibutsu; good summaries in Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 184-194; He, Buddhism in the Economic History of China, 
24-26; Li, State Religious Policy, 265-268.
128 On these events, see Tsukamoto, Hoku Shū no shūkyō haiki seisaku no hōkai; Wright, Sui Dynasty, 57-61, 110-114; 
Xiong, Emperor Yang, 15-17, 151-153.
129 Here I weave into Mark Elvin’s apt sketch of the situation under the Tuoba Wei before the late-fifth-century re-
forms (Pattern of the Chinese Past, 47).
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body may have wedged into this vicious circle by offering an initial alternative for dispossess-
ed peasants and social misfits, trapped between the rock of serfdom (thinly disguised as re-
tainership into the great clans) and the hard place of imperial taxation. To the brawny rulers 
of the north, this must have looked at first as an irresistibly soft target to smash and grab, 
especially when the vital cycle of raiding and loot-sharing had reached a dead end. But you 
cannot empty the same coffer twice: in time, allowing the clergy to grow rich again, whilst 
keeping a close eye on the monks’ names and numbers in official registers, must have seemed 
an altogether better option to expand the territorial and fiscal reach of the state, all the more 
so as it could soar on wings of genuine devotion from court to commoners. And while monks 
may have been officially denied taxpayer status in the ›Equal Field‹ system, it certainly would 
have been easier for the imperial bailiff to reclaim land and revenue from the monasteries, as 
soon as his lords would see fit, rather than thumping in frustration at the unyielding gates of 
the manors. Spoliation, for that matter, was always an option, and it was decisively taken in 
the 570s, as the Northern Zhou found through it the resources to defeat their archenemies in 
the northeast and ready themselves for the long-awaited conquest of the south. The return 
of imperial unity was finally achieved in 589, but at the hands of a successor regime, the Sui
隋, established by a Northern Zhou general and Buddhist sympathizer. The Sui showed all 
the traits of the ›strong tributary empire‹, able to enforce taxation and household registra-
tion across the entire extension of its territory, order great public works, and mobilize huge 
armies. A census in 609 returned 8,907,546 households and 46,019,956 individuals, the 
highest tally since the Eastern Han.130 A tightly regulated Buddhist community meanwhile 
reached new heights under state patronage, and it must, again, be significant that one of its 
most fervent supporters was also remembered as the architect of the Sui fiscal renaissance.131
As rulers of a unified empire, the Sui would last no more than three decades, but their in-
heritors, the Tang 唐 (618-907), would hold the scene for three centuries, and the new period 
of division that did follow their fall would quickly be ended by the advent of the Song in 960. 
It is this narrative that, as we have seen, has offered many scholars the glimpse of a China 
diverging from the West in Late Antiquity through the permanent recovery of an imperial 
statehood that the latter virtually lost forever. This would indeed be an apposite conclusion 
to these notes, if only I could endorse it. But I have suggested at the outset that even after 
the late sixth-century breakthrough, it would still take some time for ›China‹ to settle on its 
trademark cycle of long-term institutional stability; and while there is no space to consider 
the centuries up to the Song into any detail here, some final remarks may briefly broach 
prob lems that future research will hopefully address more thoroughly. 
One of them is the lingering view of the Tang, a family name in world history books, as a 
single long and successful empire after the dark centuries of division, with the Sui as a mere 
prequel. Like so many other things about that dynasty, this view is a legacy of the Song pe-
riod, but like so many others a distinctly questionable one. One should start observing, with 
the late Antonino Forte, that there were not one but two Tang dynasties: between the First 
130 See Sui shu, 29.808 and Tongdian, 7.147. On the great recovery of taxation, population registration, and economic 
infrastructure under the first Sui emperor, see the valuable analysis in Xiong, Emperor Yang, 173-195.
131 This was Gao Jiong 高熲 (d. 607), Yang Jian’s chief minister, who in the 580s established a new system of fiscal 
registration, ensuring the reversion of large numbers of vagrants and hidden retainers to the regular household re-
gisters; see Tongdian, 7.156 and Tang, Clients and Bound Retainers, 133-134. On Gao’s close ties with the Buddhist 
community, notably his sponsorship of the powerful Three Stages sect, see Hubbard, Absolute Delusion, 195-197; 
and more generally Chen, Monks and Monarchs, on Sui patronage of Buddhism.
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Tang (618-690) and the Second Tang (705-907) there was in fact a different dynasty, the 
Zhou 周 (690-705). This was established by a remarkable woman, Wu Zhao 武曌, who ruled 
in her own right as empress – decisively buttressed by Buddhist support – after a much long-
er tenure of power from behind the scenes.132 Apart from the political instability this fracture 
betrays,133 our modern sensitivities (or presentist bias) should not distract us from the scan-
dal that a female emperor meant to many of her contemporaries, and especially to those Song 
historians who successfully erased the memory of her dynasty.134 Wu Zhao’s case is there to 
suggest that in China, at the end of Late Antiquity, the imperial idea was a somewhat tenta-
tive business compared to the stiff template of later ages: how would we make room for the 
notion of a successfully reigning woman-pope in our historical view of the medieval papacy, 
for example?
But the Tang were precarious in far more compartments, and probably more significant, 
including the all-important area of taxation and household registration. The Sui may well 
have revived the glories of the Han tributary state when they could count nine million house-
holds in 609. Two or three decades later, however, their successors could not reach three mil-
lion, and as late as 652, at a time when political consolidation should have been by all means 
achieved, the tally was still well under four million.135 It is entirely plausible that, at this stage, 
the Tang elite could manage perfectly well by alternative means, including the taxation of 
commerce and good old rent-taking from imperial estates.136 If so, however, it also means 
that the suzerain power of the dynasty across its territory was limited, as there were arguab-
ly fewer places where the taxman could go and make claims on behalf of the govern ment. 
Only in the first half of the eighth century, notably during the long reign of Xuanzong 玄宗 
(r. 712-756), would the registration capacity and demographic counts of the Tang reach back 
to the Sui records. But it would not last long: the rebellion of the Turco-Sogdian general An 
Lushan 安祿山 and his successors (755-763) shook the dynasty to the core, and left it limping 
ahead for the next one and a half centuries.137 That household counts should have dropped 
spectacularly from nine million in 754 to 1.9 million in 760 is understandable, since at the 
latter date some of the most populous regions – Henan, Hebei, Shandong – were under the 
rebel dynasty of the Great Yan 燕 (756-763).138 But even after the rebellion was quelled and a 
132 Forte, Political Propaganda, xiv-xv. Of course, any China historian knows this, and yet we keep on referring to a 
single Tang dynasty, whilst – incoherently – we distinguish between the Former/Western and the Later/Eastern 
Han, separated by Wang Mang’s 王莽 Xin 新 dynasty interregnum (AD 9-23).
133 Geopolitical as well, since Wu Zhao’s power base was in Luoyang, whereas Tang emperors mostly ruled from 
Chang’an (Guanzhong).
134 See Guisso, Wu Tse-t’ien, 1-7.
135 For the first figure, see Tongdian, 7.148; Cefu yuangui, 486:11b1; Xin Tang shu, 51.1344; for the second, see Tang 
huiyao, 84.1550 (3.8m), and Cefu yuangui, 486:11b9 (3.85m). A lucid discussion of the demographic decline in the 
early Tang is in Pulleyblank, Registration of Population. Xiong (Emperor Yang, 193-194) briefly notes this problem 
and is willing to explain it as a real depopulation following »unnatural causes such as war, famine, and corvée 
[sic]«, but I cannot follow him on this point: apart from the lack of evidence for a loss of life on such a huge scale, 
it seems difficult to explain how the population could nearly double in the next five decades, as we are going to see.
136 Cf. Pulleyblank, Registration of Population, 293-295, and Twitchett, Financial Administration, 9-11.
137 On the An Lushan rebellion and its long-term repercussions see, among others, Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 
216-251, and Pulleyblank, An Lu-Shan Rebellion.
138 For the figure of 9,069,154 households in 754, see Tang huiyao, 84.1551, and Zizhi tongjian, 217.6929; the count of 
1,931,345 households in 760 is in Tang huiyao, 84.1551; also in Cefu yuangui, 486:18b5, and Xin Tang shu, 52.1362, 
with slight variations.
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sweeping fiscal reform was introduced in 780, the Tang state never recovered its full registra-
tion capacity, as tallies varied between 2.4 million households in 807 to 4.9 million in 845.139
I have argued above that census records should not be used uncritically as a gauge of 
power, for the latter comes in different kinds that may or may not converge to shape an im-
perial formation: a strong state could dispense to significant degrees with the very exercise 
of taxation and household registration, thanks to direct landownership or extraordinary le-
vies and requisitions (the Cao and Yuwen regimes in the third and sixth centuries), although 
this type regularly proved unable to produce enduring suzerainty over large territories; or 
it could survive by relying on unfortunate tributary pockets, presumably cross-subsidizing 
a larger apparatus of power (Shu Han, Wu), though in this case too not for long; or it could 
maximize its territory and indeed expand its registration reach, but not enough to secure 
a durable base of suzerain power for the centre over the periphery (as was the case of the 
Jin in the 280s). The long-lasting Tang, it would seem, managed to survive by switching 
across these different options, but we should resist viewing them as a strong tributary empire 
through out, as they only looked like one during portions of their cycle.
Against this background, we must observe that the confrontation between Buddhism and 
the state continued across this period and until the latter half of the tenth century, climaxing 
in two more major persecutions: in 845 under the Tang emperor Wuzong 武宗 (r. 840-846), 
and in 955 under the short-lived regime of the Later Zhou 周 (951-960), which ruled over 
northern China in the period of fragmentation known as the Five Dynasties (907-960), and 
would successfully morph into no less than the great Song at its end.140
At a closer look, there is a fearful symmetry between these two incidents and the first 
two proscriptions in the fifth and sixth centuries. In both cases, we have a violent and ideo-
logically loaded persecution (446, 845), followed after about one century by a less venom-
ous, economically driven suppression of the Buddhist community (574/7, 955). It is also 
noteworthy that, in the latter pair, both proscriptions of 574/7 and of 955 were launched by 
regional states in the north on the eve of decisive campaigns that would lead to the reunifi-
cation of Chinese territory, respectively under the Sui and the Song, and, arguably, provided 
through confiscation an essential quota of the resources for those ventures.
However, there were no more large-scale proscriptions of Buddhism after the tenth cen-
tury, as the ostensibly capricious oscillation between exemption and disenfranchisement, 
patronage and suppression was to find its long-term balance in a state grip on the clergy 
that would never slacken after the advent of the Song.141 The end of the confrontation with
139 The counts for 807 and 845 are respectively in Tang huiyao, 84.1551; Zizhi tongjian, 237.7647, and in Tang huiyao, 
84.1552; Xin Tang shu, 52.1363. On the demographic changes in the Tang, and in particular after the An Lushan 
rebellion, see Tang, San lun, 246-255. The fiscal reform was the so-called double-tax system (liangshui fa 兩稅法), 
based on income ranking of households rather than allotted land, and involving two yearly collections, measured 
in cash, with the simultaneous abolition of all other taxes; see Twitchett, Financial Administration, 39-48.
140 On the anti-Buddhist persecution of 845, the largest in scope, see Reischauer, Ennin’s Travels in T’ang China, 217-
271; Ch’en, Economic Background; Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 226-233; Weinstein, Buddhism under the T’ang, 114-
135. On the fourth and last suppression (in fact, a drastic downsizing and spoliation) in 955, see Makita, Go Shū 
Seshū no Bukkyō seisatsu, and the sketches in Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 22, and Worthy, Founding of 
Sung China, 32-33. Worthy offers an extremely detailed discussion of the Later Zhou transformation from regional 
regime to China-wide bureaucratic empire.
141 See Ch’en, Buddhism in China, 389-454 (with reservations, though, on his narrative of decline), and the brilliant 
He, Buddhism in the Economic History of China, 47-89.
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Buddhism that had started under the Northern Wei, and whose fundamental terms had been 
defined back then, would thus give way to the consolidation of the unified bureaucratic em-
pire as the enduring form of the Chinese polity until modernity: if nothing else, surely this 
is a ›great coincidence‹.142 Whether it also marked a fundamental divergence from the histo-
rical trajectory of the West is something that comparative historians may want to explore in 
greater depth from this particular entry point, but some preliminary counterfactual obser-
vations do seem relevant. That is, we have a very significant similarity between Eastern and 
Western Eurasia in Late Antiquity – as already noted, the fall of large tributary empires on 
both sides, followed by social, economic, and political fragmentation and the parallel rise of 
large religious bodies wedging their way into a collapsing metapolitical order. But while this 
rise had been firmly harnessed in China by the end of the first millennium, this would not be 
the case in the West: as a result, Song China and its successors would not be faced with the 
›highly organized religious community‹ of Latin Christendom, or a ›Papal Revolution‹, or a 
gigantic ›proprietary church‹ standing in the way of their imperial statehood.143 
One would not leave this chain of adventurous remarks without sounding some ringing 
note of caution. More research is doubtlessly needed, including robust scrutiny of quanti-
tative data and minute explorations of the historical contexts. And yet, haven’t we already 
start ed to question the cliché of an eternal China, fated to stay imperial and one since anti-
quity? Perhaps no one put this view more forcefully than A. C. Graham, a master Sinologist 
like few, who once quipped that »[a]bout the time when the First Emperor was looking for 
the elixir of life China discovered the secret of the immortal empire, the unkillable social 
organism.«144 The China we have known tells a different story, one where empire doth perish 
in the maelstrom of Late Antiquity, and bantam lords dance clumsily on its carcass, for cen-
turies. Until along come monks and nomads, and look what happens!
142 The Song, to be sure, also suffered invasion from the north, loss of territory, and relocation to the south (Southern 
Song, 1127-1279). Unlike the Han and the Tang, however, the Song never controlled the far north and the northwest, 
whereas their economic and demographic powerhouse had already shifted to the south in the course of the elev-
enth century. Accordingly, the northern invasions in the twelfth century did not curtail the empire’s resources of 
territory and population on a scale comparable to the position of the southern regimes in the period of division 
vis-à-vis the earlier Han unity.
143 See respectively Mitterauer, Why Europe?, 144-193; Berman, Law and Revolution, 85-119, 520-537; and Woods, 
Proprietary Church, for seminal discussions of the three concepts in inverted commas. A first, important explora-
tion of what this meant in the long run for the diverging paths of development in China and the West can now be 
found in Davids, Religion.
144 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 5. Yuri Pines has expanded on the idea twice, and at monograph-length: see his 
Envisioning Eternal Empire, and especially Everlasting Empire.
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